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INTRODUCTION

Covenantal ethics is a living system for living systems. We humans are not
simple, isolated individuals living stagnant, dead lives. Rather we are immersed in a
complex system of living, glowing and developing interpersonal relationships with
others. Philosophy in general and ethics in particular are often looked upon as dead or
dormant entities. Covenantal ethics is neither. It is a living approach to the philosophy
of ethics that recognizes the dynamic system in which we live.
Our world recently welcomed a new millennium. We moved forward, leaving
behind much of the old and eagerly anticipating what was to come. One of the many
things which we left behind was the monopoly held by theistic religion over the world's
tradition, philosophy and religion for the last one thousand years. Today the world is
much bigger than Europe and North America. The church seems much smaller. For
centuries the layman could turn for direction in moral decisions only to the church. In
one sense, theism may now be socially antiquated. While it is true that the vast majority
of Americans claim to believe in God, it is my observation that the dominant ethical
force in our society is not the Church. From what I can tell, our society, by and large, has
lost any direct connection between belief in God and normative ethical theory. In its
wake, the Church left behind innumerable rivals competing for ethical force in our
society. Human ideas like scientific advancement, political correctness, religious
pluralism and philosophical relativism have replaced the Church with respect to swaying
ethical opinion. However, even within this modern pluralistic society, there are still two
dominant ethical forces. They are Kantianism and utilitarianism. Tradition mandates
that a respectable ethicist choose between these two schools of thought. And what about
the religious ethicist? Must he or she attempt to do ethics only within the confines of
existing ethical models?

I propose to construct an ethical system that is distinct from Kantian, utilitarian
and pluralistic models. I suggest that this system will be a tenable option for the
Christian and the nonChristian, for the ethicist and the nonethicist alike. Furthermore, I
propose that this system is internally consistent and that it is useful in the field of medical
ethics. I propose to construct this system around the notion of "covenant." In this
system, we would not be bogged down with many of the philosophical problems that are
unavoidable with Kantian, utilitarian or pluralistic rhetoric. Rather, we would be able to
discern the right course of action in our lives after we first properly examined the
covenantal relationships into which we have entered.
For those of us who acknowledge a relationship with God, our primary covenant
is with Him. As a couple of contemporary ethicists note, "The experience of one's own
life as a gift from God becomes an inherent element of one's attitude toward all
interventions in life (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 40)." In a hypothetical decision,
the outcome of which would not affect any other person or thing, this covenant alone is
sufficient to discern right from wrong and better from best. In most cases, however,
other covenantal relationships need to be evaluated. For instance, as a physician, I may
have entered into a covenant with a patient, or as a husband entered a covenant with my
wife. How can I, in these particular circumstances, honor this covenant with my patient,
or that with my wife, in such a way that I also honor my covenant with God?
I propose to begin by arguing that there is a problem with the current discussions
of medical ethics and to explain why this problem exists. I will then suggest my proposal
concerning covenantal ethics and explain the origins of this idea. Subsequently, I will
describe it in greater detail, comparing and contrasting it with other existing ethical
systems. I will next describe how covenantal ethics may be used in general. I will close
by showing that this system truly will impact real decisions in medical ethics. The
question of abortion will provide me with a test case. Throughout this project, I propose
to allow historic and current criticism from theology, philosophy and society to raise
2

questions and problems for covenantal ethics. In the end, covenantal ethics will not only
survive the challenge, but will grow more vigorous because of it.

I. CHAPTER ONE

A. THERE IS A PROBLEM

There is a problem. Lots of people are having a conversation. The conversation
is about bioethics. Unfortunately, the conversation may not be going as well as people
think it is. Most significantly, a chasm is opening up between two groups of people. The
conversation is becoming reduced, figuratively speaking, to a shouting match between
two camps on opposite sides of a gorge. On one side there are people who want to talk
seriously about bioethics; on the other side there are people who want to talk seriously
about religion, specifically Christianity. Ironically, they all are trying to talk about the
same things: patients and doctors, healthcare technology and pharmacology, abortion,
euthanasia, assisted reproduction, and the problems with distributing healthcare
resources, just to name a few. While the tone of the conversation is civil and those
participating in the conversation are not literally be shouting at each other, this mental
picture helps me to communicate the idea that Christian ethicists and nonChristian
ethicists have a difficult time understanding each other. Tristram Englelhardt's book, The
Foundations of Christian Bioethics, contains a thorough explanation of how and why this
chasm developed from social, historical, ethical and religious perspectives1. The

lcf. Engelhardt 2000, xiii, 44-45
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important point is that Christians and nonChristians have allowed a canyon to open up
between them.
Christians, who once were at the center of healthcare in this country, now have a
difficult time conversing in bioethics. Both sides are responsible. Margaret Mohrmann
is a Christian author interested in bioethics who is so frustrated with the situation that she
claims, "Biomedical ethics, as it is currently conceived and practiced, is an insufficient
base for the sort of ethical ministry compelled by the suffering of those who seek medical
care (Mohrmann 1995, 3)." I mention her concerns now only to exemplify the frustration
that well-meaning Christians run into in this field, not to address her claims in detail at
this time2. She draws on the work of another Christian bioethicist, William F. May. Our
identity, she claims, is three-dimensional, "That of the body, our physical presence in the
world; that of the community, our relations with each other; and that of the ultimate, our
perception of transcendent reality, our connection to God (Mohrmann 1995, 81)." I,
perhaps, would even add a fourth dimension, that of our mind -- the way we relate to our
body is distinct from our body itself and the way we think about our relationships with
God and others is different than these actual relationships. It does not matter how many
dimensions are contained within our identity. The important point she makes is that we
are relational beings, involved in multiple relationships. She is rightly concerned about
the lack of attention paid to these relationships by the conversation of bioethics. We will
be coming back to this point often. For now, it is enough to say that Christians have a
hard time conversing in bioethics.
Bioethics can be seen as the junction between the study of philosophy
(specifically the study of ethics) and the study of biology (specifically the study of

2She claims that bioethics relies on information that is insufficient and inappropriate to lead to conclusions
that bring healing to patients. She feels strongly that bioethics relies too heavily on medical indications and
not enough on the patient's story. She urges bioethicists to avoid changing people's stories into textbook
paradigms and cases. She also criticizes the tendency to solve a problem rather than to find an answer.
After all, there may be more than one acceptable solution (Mohrmann 1995, 3).
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medical science). This type of definition is too confusing and not very practical.
Actually, most of us talk and think about bioethics all the time, even if we do not call it
by that name. Every time we ask, "Is this doctor (or nurse, or patient, etc.) really doing
the right thing?" we approach the heart of bioethics. This question comes up in our daily
encounters with our own illnesses, illnesses of family and friends, and in the news media.
Hot topics like abortion, Medicare prescription coverage for the elderly, or physicianassisted suicide are all the kinds of things on which bioethics focuses.
Why call bioethics a conversation? Bioethics is rightly called a conversation
because it cannot exist apart from conversation. In geometry, for example, you can
determine a rule that the area inside a rectangle is equal to the product of the length of
two adjacent sides. Unless you leave the real world, there is little point in talking about
this. You live by it. In bioethics, however, no such rules exist. If a fifteen year-old girl
refuses to have a blood transfusion because it would be against her parents' religion, there
is no geometric rule to follow. A bioethicist must enter into conversation with at least
her, the medical staff and her parents. But the prudent bioethicist also enters into
conversation with other bioethicists who have faced similar problems, with lawyers, with
religious leaders and with society in general to determine the right course of action. We,
as a society, converse often about bioethics. Conversation is itself the very lifeblood of
bioethics.
Somebody might ask why Christians should even care about bioethics. First,
Christians care about health. Jesus, the central figure of Christianity, dedicated much of
his ministry to improving people's physical health. In a real sense, however, everything
he did focused on improving the psychological and/or spiritual health of others. Second,
Christians care about ethics. Most of their Holy Scripture is dedicated to describing the
kind of living that is pleasing to God and beneficial to others.
There is also an historical reason for Christians to take seriously, and be taken
seriously by, the conversation of bioethics. The field of bioethics owes much of its
5

existence to Christianity. I would refer the reader again to the excellent book by H.
Tristram Engelhardt, The Foundations of Christian Bioethics. Here he gives a nearly
insurmountable argument that, not only should Christians take bioethics seriously, but
that bioethics should take Christianity seriously. While I differ from him on the best
resolution to the situation, I commend him for a well-written and convincing argument in
support of my opening claim that a large problem exists because of the divergence of
bioethics and Christianity.

B. WHY DOES THE PROBLEM EXIST?

Bioethics, we have said, is a dialogue. As with any other dialogue, people must
be able to understand the language if they are to participate. The language of bioethics
can, perhaps, be thought of as one language with different dialects confusing the
conversation. Ethics has been discussed since the time of the Ancient Greeks.
Throughout time, different ethicists have taken up different points of view that have
shaped the way they speak about ethics. Each major point of view (or, more technically,
school of thought) is like a different dialect. Classically there was only one dialect. In
modern times (roughly one hundred years ago) there were two. The contemporary
dialogue has several.
The language began with the first one to speak it. Aristotle was, arguably, the
first one to speak and clarify a unique language called ethics. He spoke the classical
dialect that has come to be known as "virtue ethics." Virtue ethics looks neither at
consequences nor at principles (the focus of the next two dialects), but focuses instead on
character. Aristotle said, "The virtue of man also will be the state of character which
makes a man good and which makes him do his work well (Aristotle 1925, 37)." And
6

also, "Moral virtue is a... mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other
deficiency (Aristotle 1925, 45)." We note that virtue is a state of character and that it
allows us to live the virtuous mean between two extremes of vice. A modern virtue
ethicist named Leslie Stephens put it this way, "The moral law... has to be expressed in
the form, 'be this,' not in the form, 'do this.' (Stephens 1882, 155)." For example, the
virtue of generosity lies between the extremes of miserliness and wastefulness. As we
will see, this classic dialect of virtue ethics is completely different than the two modem
dialects. In practice, then, when deciding whether or not to do a certain medical test,
virtue ethics maintains that it is not necessary to analyze all possible outcomes of
administering the test, nor does it suffice to rely on general testing principles. The
emphasis is on acting in such a way as to tend toward being generous (with respect to
medical assistance) and avoid being wasteful (of time and/or money).
The next dialect to come on the scene is best exemplified by Kant. This dialect is
known as deontology. The focus is not on character, as with virtue ethics, nor is it on
consequences like the next dialect we will discuss. The focus is primarily on principles
and people. Kant asserted "...That all individuals must be treated as ends-in-themselves
and not merely as means to others' ends (Kant 1988, 58)." Another, more proper, way to
state the same thing is," Act only on the maxim [principle] which you can at the same
time will to be a universal law (Kant 1988, 49)." Kant calls this principle the "categorical
imperative (Kant 1988, 49)." Deontology is all about maxims. Contemporary medical
ethics is deontological in the respect that it, too, often relies on maxims. Consider
autonomy -- the maxim that everybody has a right to decide for themselves what is done
to them. And then there is beneficence -- the maxim that we should do what is in
somebody's best interest. A difficulty can arise when two different but equal maxims
dictate conflicting actions. For instance, autonomy and beneficence may, at times,
dictate conflicting actions. Consider the case of a competent patient who refuses routine
life-saving medical treatment like a blood transfusion after a bloody auto accident. This
7

puts physicians in a situation that will "...Leave traces of regret, if not guilt, no matter
what they do (Bouma 1989, 79)," since giving the treatment against the patient's wishes
violates the principle of autonomy and allowing the patient to refuse treatment that is for
his own good violates the principle of beneficence3.
The greatest challenge to deontology in modern times has been from a dialect
called teleology. Utilitarianism, most notably advocated by John Stuart Mill, is the bestknown form of teleology. Utilitarianism has been described in lay terms as that theory
which, "Teaches that people have the single fundamental moral duty of producing the
greatest general good. ...People need only calculate the good and evil consequences of
alternative actions or policies to determine the right one (Bouma 1989, 71)." More
precisely, utilitarianism is,
"The view that the sole ultimate standard of right, wrong, and obligation is
the principle of utility, which says quite strictly that the moral end to be
sought in all we do is the greatest possible balance of good over evil (or
the least possible balance of evil over good) in the world as a whole
(Frankena 1973, 34)."
The primary focus is on the probable future results of a given action with
emphasis on the word future. Past actions or events have no moral bearing on current
decisions except if they affect the probable outcomes of the present decision. Even a
past promise is relevant only because it may affect probable outcomes of an action.
The problem is that each dialect is good in some ways and bad in others. Virtue
ethics is great at telling us how we can be ethical people, but it is very poor at telling us,
in a particular situation, what the best course of action is. A few years ago, the basketball
3Bouma et al argue that a proper understanding of "tragedy" will decrease or eliminate the guilt associated
with difficult decisions. While it is possible that they are correct, it is also possible that people, Christians in
particular, are never in a situation where all the options are bad. For instance, in the above example, the
option not explored was to enter into a discussion with the patient (in this case it would have to be brief and
to the point) and determine why he refuses the treatment. When we understand him better we may agree
that it is not in his best interest to accept the treatment (for instance, if he holds the religious belief that
accepting the transfusion jeopardizes his eternal salvation). Then there is no conflict of principles since
beneficence and autonomy mandate we allow him to refuse.
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player, Michael Jordan, was world-renown for his mastery of the game. There was even
a saying, known and recited by thousands of children who were aspiring to be good
basketball players, "I want to be like Mike." It was a pithy slogan, but gave very little
guidance for what a child should do in any particular moment on the basketball court or
playground. In the same way, virtue ethics helps us to see what kind of people we should
be, but does not tell us what to do at any particular moment.
Deontology is great in guiding us through a particular action with timeless
maxims and principles, but it does not take into account that, in this instance, following
principles may lead to more harm than good. The rule of thumb, "A penny saved is a
penny earned," is usually a good rule to live by. But if you save a thousand pennies in
your drawer for ten years, it is likely that you will have earned nothing and that the
pennies will be less useful to you now than before. You would have done yourself more
harm than good by following a rule too exactly without considering the consequences.
The strength of teleology is that it calculates how what we do impacts the world
around us for the good, but its weakness is that it cannot tell us what "good" actually is.
Recently people have tried to get around these problems in at least three ways.
(1) They can try to combine views. (2) They can deny that any certainty is possible in
these matters. (3) Or they can base morality on something other than character, maxim
or consequences.
I recognize the potential benefits of all three of these dialects and would like to
save as many of these benefits as possible. But it seems impossible to combine
effectively such completely different things4. It is tempting to deny that any certainty is
possible, but as a committed Christian, I believe I have a strong certainty about many
things that are moral in nature. To deny any certainty at all could come dangerously

4Frankena comes close with his "mixed deontological theory (Frankena 1973, 43)." but, even he admits that
his theory is still deontological in nature, albeit closer to teleology than most deontological theories.
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close to denying God and I would prefer to avoid that. So, the best solution is the third.
It would be wonderful if we could develop a dialect, an ethical theory, that is grounded
on neither virtue, principles nor consequences, but on something completely different. It
would be even better if this theory shared some of the positive qualities of virtue ethics,
teleology and deontology while avoiding their short-comings. Most importantly, could
such a theory have any practical implications?
I believe that we can and should construct such an ethical theory.

II. CHAPTER TWO

A. I PROPOSE A SOLUTION

I propose a new theory for bioethics, a new dialect. I suggest we call this theory
"Covenantal Ethics." Covenantal Ethics will be founded on the notion of covenants. It
will be an ethical theory built around a deeper understanding of the fairly common term,
"covenant," and the idea it attempts to capture. It should help us retain the respect for
persons and principles championed by deontology, the concern for the good of society
embraced by teleology and the importance of personal character promoted by virtue
ethics. It should also help keep us from getting lost when principles conflict, when what
is good for society is ambiguous and when personal virtue does not clearly dictate a
certain action. In short, Covenantal Ethics will help us avoid the pitfalls of the three
main dialects in bioethics, retain most of their strengths, and add the most crucial
concept of all, the covenant.
10

First, there is a point of clarification and grateful acknowledgment. Talking about
covenants in ethics or bioethics is not new. Many people have used the term before and a
few have even tried to elicit some ethical uses for the term. Two authors, in particular,
come to mind because they actually use the term, "covenant" in relationship to bioethics.
First, H. Bouma co-authored a book entitled Christian Faith, Health and Medical
Practice. In this book he and his co-authors draw on their religious roots and interest in
medicine to speculate how God's covenant with the Christian church might influence
Christian policies on hot topics like abortion and euthanasia. Second, William F. May
penned, The Physician's Covenant. In this work, the author argues persuasively that the
relationship between physician and patient is best described as a covenant.
Edmund Pellegrino and his co-author David Thomasma repeatedly use the idea of
covenant, even though they rarely mention it by name, in their work, The Christian
Virtues in Medical Practice. "Medicine is essentially a relationship of persons
(Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 143)." This is the essence of their work. They argue
that illness is more than biological; it affects the whole self (Pellegrino and Thomasma
1996, 87). It interferes with a person's relationships, i.e. his or her covenants. Therefore,
what is needed is compassionate healing -- the restoration of the self as a whole
(Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 88) -- the restoration of a person's covenants. In
medicine, the role of the healer is not an easy one. It requires intense personal
relationships -- powerful covenants -- between people. "No one can help anyone without
entering with his whole person into the painful situation; without taking the risk of
becoming hurt, wounded, or even destroyed in the process (Nouwen 1972, 72)."
I found the term used often in the literature, and the idea used even more, but
never to its fullest potential. No one, to my knowledge, has ever proposed that the idea
of covenant was large and sure enough to be the foundation for an entire epistemology (a
foundation, or organized system of thought that unifies all ideas within a given
framework). A valid epistemology is essential to good thinking and right acting and is,
11

therefore, crucial for bioethics. It does nobody any good if we think or act differently at
different times without a good explanation for why we decided the way we did. If we
have a strong, valid epistemology, we may perhaps still decide differently at different
times, but our underlying thought process and value system would remain unchanged.
This, then, is the heart of my project. I submit that we can and should construct
an entire ethical theory, an epistemology, around the notion of covenant. While I may
not be able to perfect this construction within the confines of a Master's thesis, I believe
- that the reader will become convinced that this project could and should be taken up
seriously by the discipline of bioethics, and especially by Christian bioethicists, in an
effort to complete and perfect it so that we all may find a better framework in which to
think and act in bioethics.
Covenantal Ethics will allow everyone, secular and Christian, bioethicist and the
general public, to speak the same moral dialect. We all have covenants. The people with
whom we covenant are different, but the covenants are more similar than different. We
all have covenants with our parents and our children. We all have covenants with our
friends and neighbors. We all have covenants with our employers (Granted, our business
relationships may be predominately contractual, but how often do we or our employer
need something that is not specifically spelled out on the contract we signed? In other
words, there are covenants there, too, as we will see better later). We all have covenants
with our society, our country and our world. So, we all share common covenants. If we
can use that common ground to construct an ethical theory, we will all be able to
understand each other. In many respects, the playing field is now level for Christian and
nonChristian ethicists.
However, I must admit that Covenantal Ethics will, in at least one respect, give
the Christian bioethicist an advantage. The advantage, though, is open to everyone
(Christian and secular alike) who would care to use it. I am speaking of the unique
covenant a Christian has with God. This is unavoidable. Religious belief cannot and
12

should not be separated from medical ethics (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 99). We
all enter into similar covenants with family, neighbors, society and the world at large and
all of these covenants will strengthen our bioethics. But, for the Christian, with the
addition of a covenant even stronger than these others, a covenant with God, it is perhaps
easier to sort through all these other covenants. After all,
"The moral life [of the Christian] is conducted from several perspectives
not shared by nonbelievers, e.g., the perspectives of creatureliness and
incarnation. As a result, one's natural tendencies and purposes are
measured against a larger purpose of human life, and the Creator's
purposes (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 72)."
God is not the God of only those who are currently Christians; he is also the God
of anyone who desires to enter into relationship with him. Therefore, this potential
advantage is not to be used as an advantage at all in the conversation about bioethics, but
rather as an invitation for all to come and experience the orderliness and simplicity of
bioethics, as organized by Covenantal Ethics, under the overriding covenant with God.
Bioethics is more organized for the Christian bioethicist since a covenant with God
necessarily becomes the central covenant around which all other covenants are
structured. Bioethics is simpler because God Himself provides direction and focus for
our other covenants.
Not only will Covenantal Ethics permit Christians to speak a language that the
rest of the world can hear and understand, not only will it proclaim anew the Gospel, it
will also allow Christians themselves to retain a strong theology. If properly understood,
Covenantal Ethics will be a continual reminder and challenge to reexamine our lives.
Continually, we will need to be looking to God and to the relationship we have with him.
The relationship will grow as we focus more of our energies into it. As we focus more
on God and understand him better, we will naturally begin to understand ourselves better.
We will become what God made us to be, fully human. Behaviors such as
compassion, promise-keeping, courage, prudence are ultimately related to what it is to be
13

fully human (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 17). These behaviors and their underlying
virtues will grow in us and enable us better to understand and serve our God, our
neighbors and our societies. "The Christian knows that doing the right and good is a
means of growing closer to God the Creator and Redeemer (Pellegrino and Thomasma
1996, 72)." Furthermore, looking at God when faced with a moral choice directs the
person toward a proper attitude of the heart (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 73). This
language is similar to virtue ethics.
Covenantal ethics also confers depth for Christian teleology and deontology. For
instance, it could just as easily and truthfully be said that looking at God directs the
person toward the ultimate good (namely God, himself) or that it directs the person
toward the ultimate person (God) and principle (divine love). In other words, not only is
God the beginning of ethics, He is also the proper end of it.
As Walter Rauschenbusch puts it,
"Christianity is most Christian when religion and ethics are viewed as
inseparable elements of the same single-minded and whole-hearted life, in
which the consciousness of God and the consciousness of humanity blend
completely. Any new movement in theology which emphatically asserts
the union of religion and ethics is likely to be a wholesome and
christianizing force in Christian thought (Rauschenbusch 1997, 14-15)."

B. WHERE THIS PROPOSAL COMES FROM

Covenantal Ethics is not uniquely Christian. In fact, its roots are found
throughout classical literature and in medical literature, not only in the Holy Bible.
Several great authors come to mind: Dickens, Dumas, Faulkner and Tolkein as classic
authors; Kass, Ramsey and Pellegrino as authors in modern biomedical ethics. This
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chapter will examine covenants in classical literature and in the Bible. Then it will
present viewpoints from a Christian (H. Bouma) and a secular (W. Frankena) writer on
Covenantal Ethics.
William F. May digs deeply into the literature of Faulkner to guide his thinking
about covenants in medicine. Faulkner is May's choice because May feels that he
acknowledges the bond between all of creation (May 1983, 106). He points out
characteristics in many of Faulkner's characters that are indicative of covenant
relationships (May 1983, 106-120). He speaks about a "promissory event," that leads to a
"character-defining relationship" with "ritual and unexpected consequences (May 1983,
106)." A covenant is initiated with some sort of event in which one party makes a pledge
to another. It is possible, but not necessary, that this pledge is written. It is possible, but
not necessary, that it is even verbalized. It is also possible that this pledge is unknown to
the parties; it could be an event that only an outside observer could guess, "promises" to
lead somewhere. A covenant consists of a character-defining relationship. A covenant is
so important and so permeates an individual's life that, without it, the individual would
be something other than he is with it. A covenant necessitates ritual and unexpected
consequences. By "ritual," I take May to refer to those consequences that are culturally
expected, since he contrasts ritual with unexpected. A written covenant, for example,
may have all the consequences our society attaches to written contracts, but it may
obligate someone to do something unexpected or unstated as well. "The covenant details
duties that give specific content to the future, while enjoying a comprehensive fidelity
that extends beyond particulars to unforeseen and unforeseeable contingencies (May
1983, 107)."
If we accept May's distinguishing characteristics of covenantal relationships, it is
easy to see them throughout classic literature. Consider Ebenezar Scrooge, one of
Charles Dickens's most famous characters from A Christmas Carol. When the Ghost of
Christmas Present takes him to see the home of his employee, Bob Cratchet, Scrooge is
15

captivated by the generous spirit of Tiny Tim, the lame son of Bob. Tiny Tim, in a
Christmas prayer before a meager feast, remembers to thank Scrooge for providing the
meal and closes with he famous line, "God bless us all, every one." This for Scrooge is a
"promissory event" that initiates a character-defining relationship between Scrooge and
Tiny Tim. A promissory event is not much like a promissory note. A promissory note is
a tangible, contractual IOU with clearly delineated terms and conditions. A promissory
event is what happens when Scrooge's life is impacted by Tiny Tim, whether or not Tiny
Tim intended it, and whether or not Scrooge is consciously aware of it. It is an event that
an onlooker (or, in this case, the reader of Dickens's tale) can sense "promises" to be a
pivotal point in Scrooge's life. The reader can see what Scrooge cannot. This apparition
will affect him throughout this evening and his life; it will help to initiate a relationship
that partially defines his character. The covenant, here established, mandates certain
actions on Scrooge's part that are responses to unforeseen contingencies in order to
maintain a comprehensive fidelity.
A similar noteworthy relationship exists between Edmond Dantes and his
employer, Monsieur Morrel, in The Count of Monte Cristo by Alexandre Dumas. Morrel
spoke a kind word to Dantes at the opening of the book. This moment was a promissory
event, the magnitude of which only Dumas could foresee. After Dantes was officially
"killed," but in actuality escaped from prison to a new life as the Count of Monte Cristo,
he dealt harshly with his enemies, but took great lengths to support Morrel through
innumerable hardships. Not even the reader could have guessed beforehand how far
Dantes would go to maintain a comprehensive fidelity to Morrel and his kin.
One last example, a favorite of mine, is little Bilbo Baggins in The Hobbit by J. R.
R. Tolkein. This simple fellow did nothing more than extend traditional hobbit
hospitality to a visitor, the wizard called Gandalf, who knocked at the front door of his
hobbit hole one spring morning. Gandalf asked if he and a few friends might stop by for
tea. Bilbo agreed. Quite soon, there were thirteen visitors in Bilbo's house. Now,
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readers today might think this is rude, but wizards like GandaIf are known for doing the
unusual and Bilbo knew this from the start. Bilbo invited his company to spend the night
and offered them breakfast the next morning. In conversation with them, he began to
sympathize with their cause and decided to join them in their quest. With this
commitment, Bilbo ended up losing a year of his simple, pleasant, hobbit life of fine
dining and good tobacco and gained a frightening, exciting, and profitable adventure that
unleashed a world-changing line of events and created bonds between himself and people
he had never even dreamed of. Through thick and thin, through adventures that would
dishearten a professional warrior, this tiny hobbit remained faithfully committed to his
friends and their cause. What he lacks in stature, strength and experience, he more than
regains in good hobbit-sense and tenacious covenant fidelity. This covenant does more
than just show us, the readers, who Bilbo Baggins already was; it makes him who he is.
His covenant defines his character. If any creature knows about covenants, it must be a
hobbit! (I can only hope my readers have had the privilege of acquainting themselves
with these amazing little people.)
Covenants abound in great literature. The greatest of all literature is the Holy
Bible. The Bible is full of covenants. All of them, says May, are derived from the
covenant God makes with his people (May 1983, 108). Perhaps the best-known covenant
is between God and Abraham. God singles out Abraham and says that he will be faithful
to him and his descendants, but in return, he expects them to be faithful to only himself.
This covenant has lasted over four thousand years. The descendants of Abraham today
still claim special privileges for themselves as God's chosen people because they still
engage in faithful worship of their God.
Covenant language is also used in the New Testament. Jesus and his disciples
spread the good news around the world that God desires to make a covenant with
everyone, not just with the Jews. He is willing to pay the highest price to accomplish
this. His Son, Jesus, came to take on himself the punishment for our sins; we, in
17

exchange, have his righteousness and can covenant with God if we are willing to receive
his gift and faithfully follow him 5.
Or consider the covenantal relationship recorded in Scripture between Peter and
Jesus. While Peter is fishing one day, Jesus calls him, "Come, follow me." With these
three words, Jesus starts a process that will turn Peter's life upside-down. This is
definitely a promissory event for Peter. Not only does this moment promise to be a
pivotal one in Peter's life, he also makes a promise to follow Jesus. The relationship
fostered from this moment is not only character defining; it is character re-defining.
Peter's role as a fisherman will be redefined as a fisher of men because of this covenant
with Jesus. Some consequences of this covenant were ritual (i.e. certain expectations
were met between a Jewish Rabbi and his disciple); many are unexpected (e.g. paying
taxes using money inside a fish or being crucified upside down, as church tradition
suggests that Peter was). This covenant with Jesus imposes ethical obligations on Peter
that he would not have had without the covenant. The covenant also makes Peter into
something different than he was without it.
The book, Christian Faith, Health and Medical Practice begins with a discussion
of covenant as it relates to biblical literature. This discussion concludes, "The Bible
portrays covenantal ethics as the appropriate response to God's creative and reconciling
work, a response that involves accepting one's call to discipleship, to the rewards and
responsibilities of being a member of God's body in the world (Bouma 1989, 84)." The
authors then suggest three examples of human relationships that they believe to be
covenantal: husband-wife; parent-child; teacher-student6. The authors suggest that, in
5Human nature, as such, does not bind us covenantally with anyone. Entrance into covenant with God is a
voluntary action motivated by God's love for us (Ramsey 1977, 185). Adherents of the doctrine of
predestination could argue that, even if nature does not bind us'to covenants, we are still bound to them out
of God's good pleasure for us. This is true since, if we are in covenant with 1-lim, we are necessarily in
covenant with each other and the rest of Creation because those covenants with others are necessitated by
our covenant with him.
6William F. May would add, "physician-patient."
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contrast to covenants made between God and humans, covenants made between humans
are not all-encompassing nor are they one-sided in origin. Human covenants do share
similar characteristics with divine covenants, however. They are based in events or
actions when people become vulnerable to each other7. The covenant creates a
community in which the common good is sought as well as the good of each individual.
Human covenants endure through time and are influenced by new developments in
unpredictable and unspecified ways (Bouma 1989, 83-95)
Bouma et al make a special point for their Christian readers. They challenge
them to engage in discussions on medical ethics and to construct arguments "Based on
universal and rational principles of morality, on legal precedents, and on an impartial
point of view (Bouma 1989, 2)." The authors go on to suggest that "It is lamentable if
Christians never speak candidly as Christians8 about medical morality (italics theirs)
(Bouma 1989, 2)." While the language Bouma et al use is deontological rather than
covenantal, they demonstrate a passion for covenants and a Christian commitment to
bioethics. "We think that the idea of covenant best conveys the moral nature of these
relationships [e.g. interpersonal relationships] (Bouma 1989, 83)." They assert that, if
Christians do not enter the dialogue of medical ethics, then no one will benefit from their
deepest convictions -- neither their society nor their own community.

7T1u's sounds a lot like May's observation of a character-defining promissory event. Times when we become
truly vulnerable and honest with each other are likely to be times that help shape our character.
8What does it mean to "speak candidly as Christians" about medical ethics? It apparently means that,
"I...Moral discernment is a communal task in which Christian patients, professionals, and other concerned
individuals engage in mutually supportive and constructively critical dialogue (Campbell 1990, 90-95)."
Some of the underlying theological assumptions of this dialogue would include faith in God as Creator,
Provider and Redeemer. These axioms stimulate certain virtues (e.g. truthfulness, humility, gratitude, care
and courage) in those who participate in the dialogue. These virtues and principles combine with Biblical
resources to shape the communal character of Christians. Each individual's character will likewise be shaped
by this dialogue. This character will reflect how an individual responds to universally accepted principles
like informed consent, autonomy and universal access to basic health care. "The stress [of covenantal ethics]
is clearly less on how religious beliefs might make a substantive difference in what one does and more on
how they shape and form the kind of person one is, that is, on one's moral character (Campbell 1990, 95)."
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For a secular perspective on Christian ethics, we note that William Frankena
argues that an agapeistic ethic (an ethic based solely on love, "agape" in Greek) could be
grounded in the principle of love of neighbor, but that love of God could not be derived
from beneficence alone. Beneficence is a principle that Frankena feels is foundational
to all of bioethics. Without faith in God's existence we could not derive, from our own
reason and experience, the command to love God. This command, however, is the
ground of an agapeistic ethic. The Christian loves God because God has created all that
is good. Charitable beneficence is grounded in God's love for us and in his revelation of
that love. It follows from faith, which is the virtue of entry into the Christian life and
which assures us of a personal relationship of love with God.
Yet, Frankena admits that there is a sense in which the law of love underlies the
entire moral law even if this cannot be derived from it. That the law and all the prophets
are summed up in the love of God and neighbor is not a conclusion of reason, but neither
does it violate it (Frankena 1973, 33).
I would argue that not only could ethics work that way, it in fact does work that
way. For Christians, the covenant with God and the love on which that covenant is
based, is the foundation for all other covenants. Since covenants are the foundation for
ethics, and God's love is the basis for all our covenants, it follows that God's love is the
basis for the entire ethic of a Christian covenantalist.
Covenants are not just found in great literature of the past. They are currently
discussed or alluded to in books about medicine. Bouma and Frankena have both hinted
at the intersection between Covenantal Ethics, Christian faith, and the medical
profession. The very word, "professional," suggests a covenantal relationship. May
argues that this name necessarily implies a covenantal faithfulness [to the profession, to
those involved in the profession, to those served by the profession] (May 1983, 17). For
May, the image of physician as covenanter is central. It forms a whole into which other
fallible images of physicians may fit (May 1983, 23). May mentions at least three
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"fallible images" of physician -- parent, fighter, and companion. A physician is a parent,
"when he reassures and shelters his children/patients in the face of suffering and [when]
kindness displaces candor as chief virtue (May 1983, 32)." As a parent the physician
exemplifies compassion and readiness to sacrifice. The physician provides shelter, order
and nurture. There is an imbalance in knowledge and power, but it is checked by
compassion so as to avoid exploitation (May 1983, 40-41). A physician is a fighter
when he demonstrates intelligence, tactics, confidence and stamina against the enemy of
disease/death (May 1983, 33). Finally, a physician is a companion when the chief aim is
to ennoble his patient and give him dignity and self-worth, "To escort a dignitary to noble
encounter with death (May 1983, 33)." All of these images, however useful in a
particular circumstance, do not do justice to the relationship between a physician and a
patient. All of these images are summed up under the more accurate image of a
physician in a covenant with his patient.
Ethics has been part of the medical profession for thousands of years. The first
medical school, taught by Hippocrates, required its students to take The Hippocratic Oath
which committed them to abide by ethical principles. May sees this oath as an
acknowledgment of the covenant between the physician and his teachers and between the
healer and the powers of healing (May 1983, 109-112). Leon Kass, in his book, Toward
a More Natural Science, also sees this oath as covenantal in nature. He notes that the
tradition epitomized by the Oath teaches the sort of ethics a physician should have.
Kass's examples include: covenant with teachers, care for sick persons, appropriate
actions and abstentions, an acknowledgment of the limitations of one's art in particular,
and the dependence on transcendent powers in general (Kass 1985, 224-248). For Kass,

9 Unchecked, this imbalance can be exploitative; it can overreach when the patient's own decisions are
overridden. This override is called paternalism (May 1983, 41-43). It is almost always undesirable, but May
acknowledges that in rare cases, paternalism can be charitable and ethically appropriate (May 1983, 52-62)
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medicine is a moral profession. Its duties are derived from (1) "the dignity and
precariousness of the goal -- health," (2) the human meaning of illness and (3) the doctorpatient relationship (Kass 1985, 211)10. Humorously, Kass observes that the recent rise
of medical ethics is indicative of how badly the profession needs it (Kass 1985, 224).
Two other philosophers agree that medicine is in need of Covenantal Ethics, even
if they never use the term. Edmond Pellegrino clearly states that, "Each sick person is
involved in a... complex web of interrelationships....(Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997,
47)" If a physician is to help a sick person, the physician needs to understand how these
relationships affect the patient's state of health. Paul Ramsey, as well, finds that
covenants are inescapable in medicine (Ramsey 1977, xii). One specific example he uses
is the process of informed consent. This is the process by which a physician explains to
the patient what he recommends, the risks and benefits of the procedure, the expected
outcome and other available options. Informed consent exemplifies the covenantal
nature of the patient-physician relationship. It can never be exhaustive; it relies on an
ongoing communication, a faithfulness between two parties. Yet it is necessary as a
bond to prevent the relationship from becoming domineering (Ramsey 1977, 4-11).
In summary, Covenantal Ethics has not sprung up out of nowhere.
Covenants have always been determinative of right action. We see covenants in
novels by Dickens, Dumas, Faulkner and Tolkein. We find covenants in both the
Old Testament and the New Testament of the Holy Bible. People writing about
medicine make it clear that covenants play a major role in the patient-physician
relationship. Now that we see where Covenantal Ethics comes from, we will be
better able to understand it.

101 would suggest that (1) The relationship is essential for defining the goal of medicine, (2) The meaning of
illness is likewise patient-specific and, therefore, determined by the particular relationship. If so, it seems
justifiable to claim that it is the relationship that provides the moral anchor for the whole enterprise.
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C. WHAT COVENANTAL ETHICS IS

Covenantal Ethics is more easily described than defined. The main reason for
this is that it is much easier to describe covenants than to define them. We live in a
culture that demands definitions and has lost some of its ability to understand
descriptions. Nevertheless, many of our most important notions are based more on
description than on definition. Notions of "profession," "friendship," "family," "love,"
and, "God" are all important ideas that we use every day. Like "covenant," it is easier to
describe "God" than to define the term. A definition that is acceptable for someone may
simultaneously fail to capture all that God is and include some things that God is not.
For instance, "God is love" is a true definition, but potentially does not include the fact
that God is also just. Also, to say that, "God is love," potentially includes notions of
"love" that are inapplicable to God. For instance, God is not the "love" of the "free love"
era of the 1960's which condoned mind-altering substances and sexual promiscuity all in
the name of love. Since "covenant" is more conducive to description than to definition, I
have included several examples and stories in this paper from which the reader may
deduce the meaning of "covenant" and hence, "Covenantal Ethics."
In this section, I shall attempt to elucidate a further description of Covenantal
Ethics by paying closer attention to both its form and its content.
First, we can deduce some things about the form of Covenantal Ethics. From
what we have discussed in the previous section, we can understand Covenantal Ethics as
an epistemology, based on the notion of covenant, that provides both the framework and
the tools that we need, both to contribute to the dialogue of biomedical ethics and to
make our own biomedical decisions. The framework provided by Covenantal Ethics is a
critical understanding of all the covenants in which we find ourselves. The tools
suggested by Covenantal Ethics are those we need in order to prioritize our covenantal
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responsibilities". The end result of practicing Covenantal Ethics by applying these tools
to this framework will be a lifetime of ethically appropriate decisions.
There are at least five other things to be said about the form of covenantal ethics.
(1) It is internally consistent. Each ethical analysis will proceed the same way. We need
not adapt a new decision-making technique every time we are confronted with a new
situation. (2) It is strong enough to withstand several criticisms. We will see it provide
responses to objections raised by deontologists, teleologists, virtue ethicists, theologians
and philosophers. As experts challenge this notion it will become stronger as people
build on the initial foundation of Covenantal Ethics provided by this thesis. (3) It is
individual. The covenants in which you find yourself will be different from the
covenants in which I am involved. These, in turn, are different from the covenants the
next generation will experience. There is an important sense in which Covenantal Ethics
is also communal, since some of our relationships are shaped by the community in which
we live. Nevertheless, even within a community, each person has entered into covenants
that are unique to that individual. (4) It is universal. In spite of the fact that each
individual is involved in different covenants, Covenantal Ethics provides a common
method of ethical analysis so the dialogue of biomedical ethics can continue to help us
all sort through ever new ethical concerns. (5) Finally, it is dynamic. Covenantal Ethics
adapts to new covenants as they arise. We are not forced to rely on rules or principles
which are dependent on either a certain historical or social context. This is the case
because covenants have been around since the beginning and will remain throughout
1 'Pellegrino and Thomasma, in Helping and Healing, differentiate four levels of duties: (1) biological, (2)
covenantal, (3) existential, and (4) theological (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 122). "What we seek is an
augmentation of philosophical ethics by Christian insights into the meaning and purpose of human life
(Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 2)." What they seek in general is specifically a strong Covenantal Ethics;
Covenantal Ethics is exactly that which can make clear the meaning and purpose of our human lives. They
fail to realize this possibility because their idea of covenant is too narrow. A covenant is more than the
various contracts they describe -- it involves whole relationships, grounded in theology (since God himself is
the foundation of all relationships), experienced as embodied, biological, beings, including their covenantal
duties (which are actually more contractual in nature), but touching on all facets of existence. In other
words, our covenants reach across all four levels of duty that they describe.
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human history. So our culture, as it develops, and we, as we grow, will be able to adapt
Covenantal Ethics as a dynamic theory of ethics to help us make our ethical decisions.
Second, we can anticipate a few things about the content of Covenantal Ethics.
Simply put, Covenantal Ethics selects useful content from other ethical theories and
unites them with a few unique contextual features under a common framework. In the
next section we will more clearly see what content Covenantal Ethics is able to extract
from various ethical theories and what content it leaves behind. As a prelude, I shall now
say that Covenantal Ethics draws on the deontological strength of principles, the
teleological focus on the end result, the focus of virtue ethics on character, the usefulness
of comparing the existing ethical decision to prior ones which is the primary focus of
casuistry, the assertion of relativism that different circumstances may call for different
ethical appraisals and the irrevocability of agreements emphasized by contract theory.
This content is combined with the content provided by William F. May in a
previous section. He speaks of "promissory events," "character-defining relationships,"
and "ritual and unexpected consequences (May 1983, 106)." These phrases provide
unique content to Covenantal Ethics. If a relationship does not contain all of these
elements, it cannot be rightly called a covenant. So, Covenantal Ethics deals only with
relationships that contain these elements. Covenantal Ethics elucidates the best
contextual features of existing ethical theories and combines them with a few unique
contextual considerations within a single epistemology.
In a nutshell, this is what covenantal ethics is. As a graduate level thesis, this
project will entertain only the basic permutations of this new theory and will present a
few basic objections to this model. I will differentiate Covenantal Ethics from standard
models of ethical theory. Then I will show one permutation of how Covenantal Ethics
could work. I will conclude by putting Covenantal Ethics to the test in a current hot spot
of bioethical debate.
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D. WHAT COVENANTAL ETHICS IS NOT

I. An Honest Perspective

This is only an initial presentation of Covenantal Ethics. It presents an alternative
to traditional approaches. Perhaps later we may build on this foundation to give more
complete answers to subtle points of difference between this and other ethical theories,
but for now, this initial overview presentation will have to suffice.
If adherents of a particular ethical theory see nothing in common between their
favorite theories and Covenantal Ethics, then I have succeeded in positing Covenantal
Ethics as something new and different. If adherents of different theories all see
similarities between their own theories and Covenantal Ethics, then I have succeeded in
bringing out the best of several different theories and making from them something new
and, potentially, better.

2. Covenantal Ethics Is Not Simply a Reformation of Deontology

There is an important difference between Covenantal Ethics and secular
deontology. The difference is that Covenantal Ethics moves beyond Kant's categorical
imperative, "Treat each person as an end in himself, not just as a means." Covenantal
Ethics indeed tries to love and honor each person. But it does more than just treat other
people as ends. Kant speaks of our duty to treat others with the respect that is due to
individual rational beings. Covenantal Ethics emphasizes that, not only are other people
unique individuals, they are, moreover, individuals with whom we have covenants. We
are bound together, not as mere ends, but as members of an ethical community. An end
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needs to be respected; another person needs to be loved. Deontology allows us to respect
and to do our duty. Covenantal Ethics provides us with the ability to love and to cherish.
Christian deontologists could try to argue that they already do everything that
Covenantal Ethics does. They could claim, for instance, that Kant's categorical
imperative is actually just a restatement of the "Golden Rule" given by Jesus in Matthew
7:12, "Do to others what you would have them do to you." If this is the case then Kant's
categorical imperative takes on a different meaning from the one he apparently intended.
Kant's categorical imperative retains its force because he separates knowledge into two
parts: that gained from experience, a posteriori, and that knowledge that is before and
beyond experience, a priori. In mathematics, we can know, a priori, before experience,
that the area of a rectangle is equal to the product of the lengths of two adjacent sides.
Our confidence in this rule is not based on our experience. We do not need to experience
many (or any) rectangles to be sure it is correct. Simply because rectangles are what they
are, we know this must be true. We know it a priori, before experience. In ethics, the
language of experience leads to teleological ideas. A priori ethical knowledge, however,
is outside of any experience. Kant's categorical imperative is the essence of our ethical a
priori knowledge. The words of Jesus, however, speak of love. Love is experiential. We
know it when we experience it. We give it away when we let others experience it. Love
cannot be a priori if it is so closely tied to experience. Therefore, the rule of love, the
"Golden Rule," cannot be a restatement of the categorical imperative.
In biomedical ethics, the covenant between the physician and patient helps
distinguish Covenantal Ethics from deontology. The "central act of medicine" is a
"healing relationship (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 4)." "Ethics is more than the
application of prima facie principles to specific cases. It is also an invitation to a way of
life, to the complete formation of the human person (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997,
7)." Deontologists who converse in bioethics rely heavily on principles like autonomy
("Each person has the right to dictate what is not to be done to his body"),
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nonmaleficence ("Physicians should do no harm"), beneficence ("Physicians should try to
do good") and justice ("Ensure the equal treatment of all persons"). Covenantal Ethics,
on the other hand, acknowledges the usefulness of these idealistic principles, but
subordinates them to the relationships that actually exist12.
It could be objected that actual relationships can be bad (e.g. slavery), so should
we not subject these bad relationships to principles? The answer is, "No." We subject
these bad relationships to more important relationships. We derive or principles from
these higher relationships. So our relationships, not our principles, take precedence. For
example, a slave's relationship to his wife and children might take precedence over his
relationship to his master and he must act accordingly. A better example, though, is
provided by Christians, for whom all covenants are under a covenant with God. The call
of God to intercede on the behalf of those who are suffering might lead a slave to actively
seek release for his fellow slaves and for himself But this is a case of one relationship,
that with God, taking precedence over another relationship, that with his master; it is not
simply one principle taking precedence over another.
Likewise, Christian physicians are bound by ethical principles, but that is not the
whole of their ethic. Christian Covenantal Ethics does not add new principles for
physicians; it holds all principles in the embrace of covenantal love. This system does
not determine precise principles to follow in every one of life's circumstances. Nor does
it negate, on the other hand, the usefulness of deontologic thought. Christian Covenantal
Ethics simply requires that the professional act so as to exemplify God's love in every
decision and circumstance (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 150)13.

12 See the next section on "Method of Application" for an example of how principles become subordinated
to relationships.
13Here are four more great ideas from Pellegrino that further testify to the difference between CE and
deontology. Even though Pellegrino was not specifically speaking of CE, his ideas are still relevant.
(1) Love is the first principle of Christian ethics (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 149). Love is not a
foundational principle for contracts.
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There is one final difference between Covenantal Ethics and deontology, although
this distinction is clearer for Christians who practice Covenantal Ethics than for others
who do so. Deontology rests on both (1) the ability of human reason to ascertain which
principles are universally valid and (2) the ability of the human will to will that which
reason dictates. Any ethic that is centered on God (i.e. Christian Covenantal Ethics)
cannot assert either of these two conditions since God has revealed the sinful, flawed
nature of humanity (Kilner 1992, 43, cf. Proverbs 3:5-6). Our reason and our wills are
incapable of such a task if the doctrine of original sin and the total depravity of humanity
is correct.
From all of this we can see that, while deontology has its uses, it does not go far
enough. Everybody, but especially Christians, needs an ethical system that goes farther.
We need for a system that goes beyond principles and rules, one that goes beyond
treating others as ends in themselves, that goes entirely beyond Kant's categorical
imperative. We need Covenantal Ethics.

3. Covenantal Ethics Is Not a Restatement of Teleology

Covenantal Ethics is easy to distinguish from teleology, an ethical theory focused
on the end result. Recall the central idea of utilitarianism (a common form of teleology),
"The utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an
end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end (Mill 1979, 34)." Or again,
(2) "The physician is not bound in the covenant with the patient always to respect the patient's autonomy,
although most of the time this is the case. Rather, the physician is bound to respect the personhood of the
patient. ..(Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 124)." Contracts do not necessarily seek to respect persons.
(3) Religion provides an ordering principle around which to balance goods. Autonomy, while important, is
ordered under love (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 78). Autonomy is paramount for contracts.
(4) A proper understanding of charity highly values respect for autonomy as seen within a framework of
relationships to other humans and to God (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 121). Contractual autonomy
does not need to consider interpersonal relationships and definitely has no apparent need for God.
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"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' or the
'greatest happiness principle' holds that actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse
of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain
(Mill 1979, 7)."
Covenantal Ethics does not exalt happiness to this degree. Covenantal Ethics
emphasizes fidelity to covenants. This is not done so as to attain happiness. Nor is
covenant fidelity a part of what constitutes happiness14. Covenantal Ethics is much more
Kantian in that it realizes that morality is desirable for its own sake and will often run
counter to those things that produce happiness (Kant 1988, 18, 30). Further, it concurs
with Kant that happiness cannot be the ultimate end since, "The problem to determine
certainly and universally what action would promote the happiness of a rational being is
completely insoluble (Kant 1988, 46)." How much more impossible is the task of
calculating the greatest good for the greatest number of rational beings! The task
mandated by Covenantal Ethics, while still difficult task, is at least possible. We can
determine which actions promote faithfulness to the covenants in which we are involved.
We respect these covenants, not because it brings happiness to us or those covenanted
with us, but simply because fidelity is required by the very nature of covenants.
For Christians, the distinction between Covenantal Ethics and teleology is even
clearer. Pellegrino and Thomasma agree that Christian love is free of utilitarian (i.e.
teleological) justification (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 147). They note that a major
difference between secular and religious medical ethics is that religious ethics realizes an
end, beyond this world, toward which we strive. This realization gives meaning and
direction to ethics. Furthermore, it provides a reason and motivation to be and act
morally in the first place (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 76). A God-centered ethic,
14Mill claims that things other than happiness can be desired in themselves. The utilitarian principle allows
for this because different individuals have different recipes for happiness, "The ingredients of happiness are
very various (Mill 1979, 35)." So these other things are desirable in that they actually are (a part of)
happiness for the person who desires them.
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while showing consideration for the good of others (i.e. doctrine of utility), puts a greater
emphasis on both the impact a decision will have on God's glory and the eternal
consequences an action has on human lives (Kilner 1992, 42). Christians have an
overarching covenant with God that enlightens all other covenants. We strive to please
him, not as payment for services rendered, nor out of fear of punishment, not for future
reward, pleasure or happiness (after all, the gift has already been given), but simply out
of gratitude.
There are at least two interesting ways in which Covenantal Ethics does resemble
teleology. The first, as was already mentioned, is that Covenantal Ethics does care about
bringing happiness into human lives (even though this is not the ultimate purpose of
human morality). The second is related to Mill's notion that only someone in a public
position, charged with the care of society, must consider public utility. Utility demands
of most people, only that they consider private utility, "The interests or happiness of
some few persons (Mill 1979, 19)." Covenantal Ethics agrees that, as individuals, we
must focus our ethical attention on "some few persons," namely those with whom we are
most closely covenanted. As we form deeper covenants with more people (i.e. as a
physician accepts more and more patients under his care), our ethical attention must
broaden as well. So, as with deontology, Covenantal Ethics draws out the best of
teleology while avoiding its pitfalls.

4. Covenantal Ethics Is Not Merely a Rekindling of Virtue Ethics

Covenantal Ethics does seek, in part, to get back to the original focus Aristotle's
ethics had on virtue and character. Given the recent focus in United States' politics on
strength of character, the time may be right for an ethical paradigm shift away from rules
toward virtue. Pellegrino and Thomasma agree that,
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"The ground is being cleared [I understand that he is here referring to
current trends in society and moral philosophy] for the return of virtue, not
so much as the sole basis of moral philosophy, but as an essential element
of any ethical theory related, on the one hand, to principles and duties and,
on the other, to the motivation for moral behavior. The establishment of
these linkages.., is the central task of contemporary moral philosophy
(Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 14)."
Covenantal Ethics is the answer to that task. Covenantal Ethics provides a link
between virtue, duty and motivation. Like virtue ethics, every time we put Covenantal
Ethics into practice it becomes more a part of who we are. Covenantal Ethics is not a
single virtue. Nor is it simply a collection of virtues. Rather it recognizes the truth of
what was said earlier, that each covenant in which we are involved is character-defining
for us. The more we recognize these covenants and act in ways that honor and strengthen
them, the more our covenants can build our character. We become persons more closely
interconnected with each other. Our ethical decisions become part of the fabric into
which we are woven. They become part of our character. In that sense, we necessarily
become virtuous as we practice Covenantal Ethics, even if Covenantal Ethics is itself
neither a virtue nor a collection of virtues. Our motivation for action is faithfulness to
the covenants that we have. Our guide for action is found within these same covenants as
we consider how any proposed action would affect them. Covenantal Ethics begins the
process of answering Pellegrino's challenge of linking principles with motivation_
Nevertheless, unlike strict virtue ethics, Covenantal Ethics does not treat virtue as
the sole basis of moral philosophy. It also differs from virtue ethics by providing a
means of decision-makingl 5 as well as a description of a virtuous character. There is an
additional distinction for Christians. Christian Covenantal Ethics gives an ultimate
model of the virtuous person, Jesus. Virtue ethics is dependent, by its very nature, on the
historical culture that embraces it. Different societies treat different human

15Please see the section, "Method of Application."
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characteristics as virtues at different times. The character of the person, Jesus, is
timeless and has been embraced by hundreds of societies over thousands of years (Kilner
1992, 46). Jesus, himself a virtuous person, was more focused on relationships than he
was on rules or virtue. His ministry, God's ministry, was one of reconciliation (cf. 2
Corinthians 5:16-21). He taught rules (e.g. "The Golden Rule"). He lived a virtuous life
and encouraged his followers to do the same. Nevertheless, his focus was not primarily
on these rules or virtues, but rather on a personal relationship with God the Father. His
ardent prayer was that humans could engage in covenants that were as deeply meaningful
as the covenant he had with "the Father (cf. John 17)."

5. Covenantal Ethics Is Not Casuistry By a Different Name16

Casuistry traces its roots back to the Jesuit movement in the late middle ages.
This movement was relatively small compared to the rest of Catholicism, and the ethics
generated by the movement were frowned upon by the rest of Christendom. Their
influence, however, was keenly felt in the New World and casuistry has silently become
the basis for much of bioethics in the United States.
Here's how it works (in an overly simplified version). A group of people,
preferably ethicists, get together. They agree on cases called, "paradigms," that everyone
agrees are obviously wrong or obviously right. For example, they all may agree that a
hypothetical case of premeditated murder may serve as a paradigm case as a morally
wrong action. Or they all may agree that a paradigm case of morally good behavior is a
hypothetical case where someone gives an anonymous gift of several thousand dollars for

16This section heavily relies on Jonsen, AR and Touhnin, S. The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral
Reasoning. Berkley: University of California Press, 1988.
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a poor child's life-saving operation. The group then tackles cases that are slightly less
clear and determines whether they are more like one paradigm case or the other. For
example, what if the gift was not anonymous? What if the victim of the premeditated
murder was a cruel and ruthless tyrant? If they can agree on the moral status of these
new cases, then these new cases can serve as paradigms for future cases.
The basis of casuistry is a focus on ethical cases. Case-based ethics is how many
hospitals and medical schools run their ethics departments. They focus their attention on
particular cases as they arise. For instance, a hypothetical hospital ethics committee may
have a case of a 15 year-old male Jehovah's witness who refuses blood transfusions for a
life-saving operation. When the committee notices that this case is similar to a one they
had two years ago, but slightly different (the case two years ago maybe involved a girl,
while this one involves a boy), and then decides to handle this case the same way it
handled the last one (since they feel that the gender of the patient makes no ethical
difference), they are practicing casuistry.
Covenantal Ethics agrees that we can learn from past experiences. We can, and
should, compare how things are similar and different in one case to the next. These
differences may even tip the scale one way or the other in our decision-making process.
These are the strengths of casuistry that Covenantal Ethics seeks to save. However,
Covenantal Ethics is more than moral taxonomy (comparing each case to an existing
spectrum of cases). We strive to find a "fitting" answer rather than the right one17.
Ethics is not "Just about what should or should not be done in a particular instance. It is
about how to understand what happens to us and what to do about it (Mohnnann 1995,

17i,Fitti• ng here refers to the work of Margaret Mohnnann. She was concerned about whether or not a
given course of action fit well into a particular patient's life-story. For instance, has the hypothetical
Jehovah's Witness child demonstrated a tendency to rebel from the church or an unswerving devotion to it?
If the devotion is informed and sincere, it would be more fitting to accept the patient's refiisal than to
override it.
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8)." Mohrmann could have just as easily said that ethics is about understanding and
acting upon our covenants.
Is there a difference between a Christian casuistry and Covenantal Ethics?
Actually, there are two major differences. First, a major shortcoming of casuistry is its
lack of absolutes. Casuistry has only paradigms, not absolutes. Paradigms are only
derived from consensus within a group. This group is necessarily only a representative
group of only one society. As a society changes, the group changes. As the group
changes, the paradigms change. As the paradigms change, so does the casuistry. By the
same reasoning, not only do paradigms change, but there is also a change in the way
specific cases are related to existing paradigms. A truly Christian casuistry can overcome
some of this difficulty by adopting a mixed casuistry that incorporates some form of
either divine-command theory ("God said it. I believe it. That settles it.") or deontology
(allowing casuistry to be guided by certain principles). This mixture would allow
paradigms to be more universally valid and less historically dependent. But then, is this
truly casuistry? It becomes much less casuistic and much more covenantal, at least in so
far as Covenantal Ethics would be practiced by Christians with similar covenants to those
experienced by Christian casuists.
Second, at the heart of casuistry is the task of discerning where an actual case best
fits in the spectrum of paradigmatic cases. In this sense, it is rather impersonal. This
stands in contrast to Covenantal Ethics where the basic premise is discerning how to best
honor the covenants into which we have entered with real people. We focus on personal
relationships rather than more impersonal relationships of moral taxonomy.
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6. Covenantal Ethics Is Distinct From Relativism

While there are at least three separate forms of relativism (Frankena 1973, 109), it
is enough for our purposes to know the central idea of relativism. Relativists claim that
there can be no moral absolutes; after all, different people at different times claim
different things to be good and bad. Nobody can prove for certain that any one system of
morality is any better than another. This recognizes pluralism, the view that there are
many "right" answers, but no "best" answers18. This is the prevalent view in modern
America. Everybody has a different viewpoint and we must be careful not to criticize
anybody else's views because all viewpoints are thought to be equally acceptable. It is
not right for anybody to criticize atheism, Zen Buddhism, lesbianism, pantheism or any
other religious or political "ism." After all, what makes the one doing the criticizing any
better than the one criticized? The problem with all this is that,
"Much of the moral destitute into which we believe the professions -medicine law, even the ministry -- have fallen is the consequence of
ethical claims without a moral philosophy on which to ground them.
Without a moral philosophy of medicine and an accompanying moral
theology, the compass points by which policies, laws, regulations, and
contracts are to be judged are lacking. Moral arguments based on utility,
cost-benefit analysis, contract law, economic restraints, unbridled
individualism, [I would add 'personhood' to the list] or the exaltation of
society's needs over those of the individual are all symptoms of 'moral
malaise.' One obvious result is the increasing willingness of some
societies to depreciate the value of the most vulnerable among us: the
aged, the very young, the poor, and the disenfranchised. Without the
constraints of a moral philosophy that goes beyond quandary solving,
claims and counterclaims compete with one another and conflict is
resolved by yielding to the most energetic and strident voice (Pellegrino
and Thomasma 1997, 6)."

18Consequences of moral pluralism include: (1) Legal decisions guide morality, (2) Autonomy is crowding
beneficence, (3) Ethics is less normative and more conceptual (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 89).
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Fortunately, the author goes on to show that religion is still the ultimate source of
reality for many people (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 6). I take this to mean that
people in general, and Americans in particular, still have a need for covenant fidelity that
is not satiated by relativism or pluralism.
How could Covenantal Ethics be mistaken for relativism? As Pellegrino points
out, the virtue of charity does not give us a formula or set of rules that dictate how much
we should sacrifice ourselves in any given situation. It simply calls us to give ourselves
for others including our family, friends and self (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, 77).
Covenantal Ethics could be misinterpreted to say that there is no right answer and that
every ethical decision is made arbitrarily. If this were the case, then Covenantal Ethics
would be another form of relativism. Fortunately, it is not. While each ethical decision
is unique in that it affects our covenants in different ways, we still use the same tools of
ethical decision-making and work within the same framework (epistemology) every time.
For a Christian, the difference is even more distinct since a Christian has an absolute
covenant with God. Thus, there is an absolute upon which everything else depends.

7. Covenantal Ethics Is Not Contract Theory

Perhaps one of the most important distinctions to make is the one between
Covenantal Ethics and contractual ethics. It is not a difficult distinction. There is a fairly
straight-forward distinction between contracts and covenants in general.
"Contract and covenant, materially considered, seem like first cousins;
they both include an exchange and an agreement between parties. But, in
spirit, contact and covenant are quite different. Contracts are external;
covenants are internal to the parties involved. Contracts are signed to be
expediently discharge. Covenants have a gratuitous, growing edge to
them that nourishes rather than limits the relationship (May 1975, 34)."
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This distinction carries directly over to distinguish between Covenantal Ethics
and contract theory. Nevertheless, the contract model of ethics is so prevalent that it
behooves us to spend some time being clear on this point. This section is longer than the
others, not because Covenantal Ethics is truly difficult to distinguish from contract ethics,
but because I anticipate many objections from people whose lives are permeated with
contracts. Contracts are so prevalent that everything looks like a contract whether it is or
is not. Covenantal Ethics is not contract ethics.
The predominant model for relationships in the early twenty-first century
American medicine is definitely not covenantal in nature. The popular trend right now is
to hire out medical services by means of a complex set of contracts drawn up between
patients and HMOs, HMOs and physicians, patients and physicians, physicians and
insurance companies, insurance companies and patients, patients and specialists, not to
mention the government or hundreds of ancillary medical service providers19. Bouma et
al realize that the model of covenant must not be confused with the popular contractual
model. They do a good job distinguishing between commercial contracts and covenants
(Bouma 1989, 85, 86), but may fail to adequately distinguish covenants from contracts of
a moral nature (Hare 1991, 20-22)20.
The previously mentioned characteristics of covenants should be sufficient to
distinguish covenant from commercial contract. If the reader is still unclear, I'll cite
Bouma et al again. "Contracts usually state explicitly the relevant rights and obligations

19"The kind of minimalism that a purely contractualist understanding of the professional relationship
encourages produces a professional too grudging, too calculating, too lacking in spontaneity, too quickly
exhausted to go the second mile with patients along their road of distress (May 1989, 122)."
20In other words, it is not enough to differentiate between covenants and commercial contracts (e.g. a
contract signed by an employer and employee). There are other types of contracts, specifically moral
contracts, that are different from commercial ones. Hare criticizes Bouma et al for not making this
distinction. We'll come back to this point shortly. For now, I shall say that Hare was not fully convincing
that moral contracts are truly distinct from commercial ones or, if they are, that they would not be better
termed "covenants."
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of all parties involved, but... [there is an obvious difficulty of] explicitly stating in
contractual language what are really covenantal responsibilities (Bouma 1989, 85)" A
patient may have more needs than could be identified or expected when the contract
between patient and physician was initially formed. In a contractual model of medical
ethics, the physician would not be obliged to assist the patient with these unspecified
needs unless another, more specific contract was created. A covenantal model of
medical ethics, on the other hand, would oblige the physician to meet these needs, even
though there was no way of knowing this responsibility at the initiation of the
relationship21.
Since covenants usually involve a sense of gift and indebtedness, it often remains
impossible to completely pay off the debt. May likes the characters of William Fualkner.
He examines the characters of a young white boy and a neighborly Black man in the Old
South. The man saves the boy from drowning. There is a relationship established at this
moment. The boy wishes to, in some sense, write a contract defining their relationship.
He attempts to pay the man all his money -- a few cents. The man refuses this gesture,
content to have given the boy a gift. He further refuses a larger monetary payment later
when the boy (now a young man) leaves one at his doorstep. The debt is paid back only
later. Racists in the young man's town threaten the life of the man who saved him from
drowning when he was only a boy. Now the young man feels obligated to save the life of
the Black man. It cost him his reputation, career and family. How could the boy or man
have known what their covenantal relationship would entail at the moment of the
promissory event of saving the boy's life? How could the man at that time possibly have
dictated such a duty in any contract? Even when the debt is "paid off' the feeling is not

21"It is precisely those features of the relationship that a contract cannot cover -- the uncertainties inherent
in the clinical situation and reliance on the fidelity and goodwill of the physician and patient -- that charity
most closely regulates (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 152) In other words we need loving covenants,
not contracts.
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one of obligation, but rather a sense that the man's gift established a relationship of
mutual helping between the two individuals -- a covenant (May 1983, 120)22. This
makes it clear that a covenant is distinct from a commercial contract (and from a moral
contract if there truly be such an entity). The Christian community, in particular should
find this distinction helpful (Minnema 1991, 196-199).
A pause is now appropriate to consider in more detail the claim made by Hare.
John Hare suggests that, while "covenant" has been distinguished from "commercial
contract," it has not been sufficiently distinguished from a "moral contract." Bouma et al
try and separate themselves from a purely Kantian perspective. They say that they are
contrasting "covenant" with what John Rawls (a Kantian) presents as "contract23."
Unfortunately, Bouma et al have interpreted Rawls to say that explicitness of contract,
immutability of relationships, and mutual equality are all necessary for a contract
(Bouma 1989, 83). Hare argues that Rawls never put such qualifications on a moral
contract; these are the current prerequisites of commercial contracts (Hare 1991, 20-22).
Hare is correct, but if these conditions are not associated with a contract then "contract"
means something completely different than what most people think of when they speak
of "contracts." If Hare is merely trying to say that moral relationships are different than
commercial ones, he may be able to communicate more effectively if he spoke of
covenants rather than using a meaning of "contract," that may be historically accurate,
but fails to capture the current understanding of the term. Covenantal Ethics
encompasses all that a moral contract would and then goes beyond it.

22Please permit one further example. In the movie "Robin Hood, Prince of Thieves" Robin rescues a Moor
from death in a Turkish prison and this Moor draws up a moral contract to never leave Robin until he has
spared Robin's life. The irony is that the two of them become so close that their relationship does not allow
the Moor to leave even after his moral contract is fulfilled. There is still a bond (covenant?) between them
that superseded the moral contract.
23The authors may actually be contrasting their opinion with the contract model presented by Veatch.
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"At the base of all contracts and covenants between persons is a duty to right any
imbalance within those contracts (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1997, 57)." I disagree. At
the base of covenants is not a duty to right imbalances, but rather a respect for the other
party and a desire to honor and serve them. Otherwise we have only the impotent actions
of the little White boy in Faulkner's tale trying to pay for his life with a few pennies.
Please allow me to ask and answer one last question in this chapter, "Would
contractual ethicists see Covenantal Ethics as distinct from contractualism?" At first
glance, I'd say, "No." Ethicists like Veatch, building on Rawls, who built on Kant, have
spent immeasurable time developing a contractual model of ethics. Yet even if I fail to
convince, perhaps I may at least generate some worthwhile dialogue by asking the right
questions.
The deeper, hidden, question is, "Can or should they be satisfied?"
Contract theorists share quite a bit in common with Engelhardt's notion of the
differences between moral strangers and moral friends (Engelhardt 2000, xxi). It is
difficult to come to much of an ethical agreement, Engelhardt would claim, if two people
share no more in common than the rules of engagement for ethical debate. However,
between ethical friends, those with a shared belief system, ethics becomes more
productive. I think Engelhardt might even agree with the sentiment behind the following
notion. As we move from moral strangers to moral friends we move from having a
relationship characterized by a set of rules of engagement (like civilized countries at
war), through a stage where we can agree to a limited number of concepts (like
competitors in the same market), through a stage where we can agree to even more
similarities (like partners in a corporation), until we arrive at stages where we share much
in common (like friends or family), perhaps ultimately arriving at the relationship
between a transcendent God and His immanent people (the deepest of all conceivable
covenants). If this is the case then it seems that our relationship moves from a stage
where not even a contract is possible, through a contract stage and into a stage where a
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contract is simply too shallow a term to describe the relationship. This concept of a
spectrum of moral relationships is an original idea, as far as I know. I am not aware of
anyone else presenting it. It helps us to see how Covenantal Ethics includes, but is not
limited to contracts.
Perhaps ethics is all about describing with different terms the different
relationships in which people find themselves. But I think we can use "covenant" loosely
to describe any ethical relationship in which we find ourselves24. Covenants grow
deeper as the moral friendship develops. There is definitely a point where covenantal
ethics is limited to contractual ethics, but there are also times when covenants will not
even permit contracts and others where even contracts could not possibly describe our
ethical responsibilities. Consider a hypothetical physician who has a contractual relation
to an HMO. Assuming that he has no personal relationship with the administrators of the
HMO then his relationship is predominately contractual. It is, from a higher perspective,
also covenantal, but the covenant is best honored by honoring the contract. If the
physician is also Christian then his relationship becomes less purely contractual. He is
obligated by his covenant with God to pray for his employer, to go beyond what is
contractually required of him, to forgive grievances, etc. He still is in a contractual
relationship, but the contract is subsumed under the covenant. Covenantal Ethics
includes, but is not limited to, contract ethics.
Covenantal ethics is different from all other ethical theories.

24It is definitely a more all-encompassing term than "contract" which, I have shown, has only limited
applications for bioethics.
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III. CHAP 1 ER THREE

A. IN GENERAL, HOW CAN WE USE COVENANTAL ETHICS?

Much of the work is now complete. We have seen that a problem exists in the
dialogue of bioethics and have proposed Covenantal Ethics as the best possible solution.
We have shown from where Covenantal Ethics originates, what it is, and what it is not.
The one remaining task is to explain how Covenantal Ethics may actually be used in the
field of bioethics. Before I begin, I shall address one anticipated objection. I will then
note two or three characteristics of any model, or "methodology," of Covenantal Ethics.
Second, I will suggest one possible, general methodology. Finally, I shall use this
methodology to apply Covenantal Ethics to areas of current, vigorous, bioethical debate.
As a preliminary, some could wonder, "Why worry about methodology if the
outcomes are the same?" "Who cares if somebody uses Covenantal Ethics or deontology
as long as they end up doing the same thing?"
This is a true story. I was riding an elevator in a Las Vegas casino, on my way
out. A woman had been riding with me for several floors. A new man got on, obviously
excited to get back to the casino. The woman picked up on his exuberance and asked,
"How did you do last night?"
"I won five thousand dollars!" he exclaimed.
"That's great!"
"I know. I got a royal flush!"
I was impressed. I wondered which style of poker he had been playing. There
were several different varieties of video poker in that particular casino and a few

43

different live tables as well. I was thinking of asking him what style he had been playing,
but the woman beat me to it.
"What were you playing?" she asked
"I don't know," he answered, "I think it was blackjack."
Why does it matter what methodology you use if you get the same result? It
matters because I would prefer it if people involved in making ethical decisions used a
methodology that was better than the one employed by this novice gambler. Since we
can agree that some methodologies are better than others, it apparently does matter which
one we use. There are several things about the methodology of Covenantal Ethics that
make it appealing.
First, Covenantal Ethics would encourage us to view biomedical ethics as a
communal responsibility in which Christians speak candidly as Christians in an ethical
dialogue in which they construct arguments "...Based on universal and rational principles
of morality, on legal precedents, and on an impartial point of view (Bouma 1989, 2)."
One characteristic of any methodology for Covenantal Ethics is that it is
communal. The dialogue on medical ethics should be seen as a communal responsibility.
In other words, conversing about medical ethics is the responsibility of more than one
person. It also takes into account the fact that we are all part of larger communities.
There are actually two ways to view communal responsibilities. We can view them as
collective responsibilities or corporate responsibilities. Should we view our
responsibility toward the bioethical dialogue collectively or corporately? If the former,
then most of us can quietly excuse ourselves from the conversation; actions that are
collective responsibilities allow for some members of the collective to be responsible
while others are not (e.g. NBA games are collective responsibility; only the paid
professionals in our society necessarily must participate). If the later, then all of us must
live up to our responsibilities (e.g. elections in this country are corporate; the result
depends necessarily on the way each citizen discharged his / her voting responsibility).
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If this dialogue is seen as a collective responsibility then we should determine
what sort of collective responsibility it is. Michael J. Zimmerman offers a taxonomy of
collective responsibility (Zimmerman 1991, 269-286)25. While other classifications are
possible (and may prove to be beneficial), it seems that the category of, "oversupplied,
simultaneous action," is a plausible taxon for the dialogue in bioethics. "Oversupplied" is
defined as the case where "there is a greater supply of agents involved in the action than
is in fact necessary for the outcome at issue (Zimmerman 1991, 277)." There are indeed
more agents (people) involved in the dialogue than are necessary for the dialogue to
occur26. Zimmerman argues that each agent is equally responsible for the action. The
dialogue is itself an action, but when some people refuse to participate, they then commit
an omission for which they are responsible. Even though it is an on-going process the
dialogue seems to be a simultaneous action. It is not a series of dialogues that produces a
state of affairs, but rather the continuous, unbroken dialogue. Therefore it could be
argued that it is the moral obligation of each of us to ensure an appropriate, continuous,
useful dialogue.
If this dialogue is conceived of in corporate terms (and this seems especially
appropriate for the Christian community who view themselves as a single "Body of
Christ") then we need not concern ourselves with proper classification. It has been
argued that entire corporations can be responsible for omissions (May 1991, 313-324) as
well as actions (Viel 199627) that are committed by individuals within the corporation.
25His taxonomy is based on the distinctions of 1) standard vs. oversupplied [Are there just enough or too
many people performing the act compared to how many are actually needed to perform the act?], 2) action
vs. omission and 3) simultaneous vs. sequential [do people act at the same time or one after the other?]
(Zimmerman 1991, 277).
26It could be argued that this particular dialogue (i.e. the one that actually exists, not simply any old
random hypothetical dialogue) could not occur without the participation of everyone who has contributed;
this would make it seem that the dialogue is a standard-type action. In either case, every participant shares
in the responsibility.
27Viel, Matthew D. "Mens Rea and Vicarious Corporate Responsibility," unpublished paper submitted on
March 13, 1996 to the Philosophy 365W "Ethical Theory" course at Calvin College.
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This being the case, all Christians share equally, as a corporate body, the responsibility
for proper dialogue in bioethics whether or not any particular individual contributes (or
neglects to contribute). This is important since it leaves no room for sitting on the fence
or for moral apathy. Any person who confesses to be a Christian shares in the corporate
responsibility to advance the dialogue of bioethics. While it may be impossible and
undesirable, in practical terms, for every individual to become a bioethicist, still each
individual is responsible to advance the dialogue. An analogy may be seen in the fact
that not every citizen is a politician, yet every citizen shares responsibility for elections.
If we become apathetic, and dismiss our corporate responsibility to vote then our
politicians may fail to act responsibly. In the same way, if we become apathetic and
dismiss our corporate responsibility to bioethics then our physicians, health maintenance
organizations and others will fail to act responsibly.
The second and third characteristics of any methodology are flexibility and
honesty. Covenantal Ethics is a living system. The dialogue is, in one sense, a
simultaneous action, but it is constantly changing, growing and developing, just like we
are. After all, we, ourselves, are living systems. As such, even if we are convinced that
something is true today, we must listen to the thoughts of people who say otherwise. It
might turn out that they are completely wrong, but it may turn out that we are the ones
who are in error. We must be honest about what is certain and what is only reasonable
opinion.
While the notion of Covenantal Ethics is probably flexible enough to allow for
several different and equally useful methodologies, I will venture to set forth one that
appears to be simultaneously thorough, flexible, complete, and simple. Various
methodologies could result from the different circumstances in which we find
ourselves28. The methodology I present here is the best one I could construct, but I

28Both the classical Aristotelian circumstances (e.g. agent, place, object) and other recognized
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recognize that there may be better methodologies constructed by others in different
circumstances. Whenever we face an ethical decision, we could utilize Covenantal
Ethics by observing this methodology-•

(1) Recognize which of our covenants will be affected by this particular decision.

• (2) Recognize the different priority each covenant holds for us.
• (3) Eliminate any choices that violate the most important of our covenants.
• (4) Seek out options that show respect for all of our covenants.
• (5) Recognize that there may be no "best" choice.
• (6) Choose the option that best strengthens our most important covenant(s).
•

(7) Act on that decision.

• (8) Assess the impact the decision made on all of our covenants.
• (9) Communicate honestly with those affected by this decision.
• (10) Recognize that each ethical decision may require different degrees of analysis.
The reader may well ask on what basis I claim this methodology to be superior to
any other. I answer that I make no such claim. Covenantal Ethics likely has room for
several methodologies. But all of them would share the same framework and tools. Any
methodology employing Covenantal Ethics would differ from the methodology of
deontology (one that relies on assessing rational principles -- e.g., "Can I will that the
maxim on which I base this decision be a universal maxim?") or teleology ("Which
calculation should I use to determine net happiness in one decision versus another?"). I
only mention this particular methodology as a foundation on which to build. Since
Covenantal Ethics is flexible, I realize that it may well need to be adapted.
As a hypothetical example, let us consider a gentleman physician who leads a
healthcare team caring for an aged male veteran with terminal cancer who has recently

circumstances (e.g. culture).
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developed a likely irreversible coma. The man has no family and no advance directives.
The physician has cared for him for many years. The ethical questions facing the
physician are, "Shall I intubate this patient? Shall I feed him through a tube? Shall I
initiate palliative care procedures29? Shall I give the patient a lethal dose of pain
medication?"
(1) This hypothetical physician identifies that his covenants with God, the patient,
the rest of the healthcare team, and society will be affected by the decision he makes. (2)
He recognizes that these covenants are listed in decreasing order of importance. (i.e.. He
listed the strongest first). (3) He eliminates the last option because it would violate the
covenant he has with God30,31. (4,5 and 6) In an effort to respect all his covenants the
doctor considers the first two options. He recalls conversations he had with the patient
after a fellow veteran committed suicide when diagnosed with cancer. The patient then
expressed a desire to live as long as he could, "on my own two feet" and stated he never
"wanted to be dependent on any machine." He concludes that, even if both of the
remaining options respect the covenants he has with God, his coworkers and himself, the
second option is more respectful to the covenant he has with the patient32. He chooses
29Palliative care is similar to the more widely discussed "hospice" care. The focus shifts from prolonging
the patient's life while an attempt is made to cure the disease or halt its progression to a focus on improving
the patient's life with the terminal illness.
30The correctness of our hypothetical doctor's understanding of his covenant with God is secondary. The
main point is that the methodology of Covenantal Ethics can play out in real-life examples.
31A fellow medical student, Mark Hoover, asked, "Was Jesus free to choose the lesser of two evils without
sinning?" I think my colleague wanted to make at least two points. First, that it is conceivable that all
possible decisions seem to violate the most important of our covenants. Second, that even when we seem to
be in an ethical dilemma, we Christians should have the faith that God will provide a way out, as He did for
Jesus when he was tempted. He will always give us an opportunity to honor the covenant we have with
Him. So I answer, "Jesus was not free to choose the lesser of two evils without sinning because Jesus had a
clear, strong recognition of the covenant he had with the Father and always found a way to honor that
covenant. His choice was between two or more evils and the covenant with God. He chose the latter and,
therefore, from a theological perspective, was without sin."
32Since the second option shows more respect for the covenant with patient and since the patient is also in
covenant with God and the healthcare team, it follows that the second option actually shows more respect
for all the other covenants the physician has identified as well, even though, considered independently of
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this option. (7) The doctor discontinues repeated needle sticks for lab tests. He
discontinues jostling the patient for daily chest x-rays following the developing
pneumonia. He begins more aggressive pain management and orders increasing nursing
attention to matters of cleanliness, oral care, position and skin care. The patient,
apparently pain free, dies a week later. (8) The physician recognizes that this decision
and course of action has not only affected the patient, but also has affected himself and
the nursing staff. (9) He makes sure that the nurses know that their service was
appreciated and listens to any feedback they give him. He also takes a moment for selfreflection rather than just pushing the matter aside. (10) He is thankful that this
particular decision, while it required some reflection on his part, did not require the level
of analysis that it may have if the patient were a stranger to him
This was only a hypothetical case and a relatively easy one at that. Covenantal
Ethics may be more difficult for the nonChristian in the same hypothetical situation. The
nonChrstian physician would not have identified a covenant with God in (1) or ranked it
in (2). The last option, administering a lethal dose of pain medication, cannot be so
quickly eliminated in (3). The physician must carefully weigh his other covenants. What
does his society dictate as an acceptable course of action? How does that compare to
what the patient would have wanted? How do both of these jibe with the perspectives of
the rest of the healthcare team. Without the order provided by an overriding covenant
with God, the decision-making process becomes more difficult. In order to do his job
completely effectively, the physician probably should seek out legal counsel (or have
done so in the recent past) to understand his societal covenants, look back through his
progress notes (or his memory) for any discussions with the patient on this topic, identify
any institutional policies and the preferences of his healthcare team. Once all of these
are accomplished, then and only then will he be able to determine whether a lethal dose

each other, these other covenants would be respected with the first option as well.
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of pain medication should be rejected. The following steps of the methodology would
proceed in a fashion similar to that presented in the previous hypothetical example. All
this goes to show that Covenantal Ethics works in hypothetical examples for Christians
and nonChristians, albeit more ordered and simple for the Christian. However, this
methodology does hot hold much meaning if it only works on hypotheticals; we need to
test in on real and important matters.
No matter how it is construed, all of us as citizens on Earth, and especially those
of us here in the United States (the focal point of much of the bioethical debate), share
corporate responsibility for the dialogue in bioethics to which we may or may not be
paying much attention. With this in mind, let us test the theory of covenantal ethics in
some of our current medical dilemmas, always realizing the necessity to be flexible and
to both avoid overconfidence and promote honesty over certainty. We will begin with a
discussion of abortion. We could also discuss euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide
since Covenantal Ethics impacts the way we view the termination of life in general. Or
we could discuss reproductive technology, allocation of resources, or genetic research
since Covenantal Ethics shapes the way we view life in general. But let us begin at the
very beginning of human life and discuss our covenants with the not-yet born.
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B. COVENANTAL ETHICS INFORMS OUR VIEWS ON TERMINATING LIFE

1. The Intersection of Covenantal Ethics and Current Themes in Bioethics

a. A Call For All Of Us to Step Down Off Of Our Soapboxes

Our court systems have been filled with cases about the legality of ending lives.
Bliz7-words like "Abortion," "Euthanasia," "Physician-Assisted Suicide," "The Right To
Choose," or "The Sanctity of Life" immediately force many of us to take a hard and fast
stance to defend our individual opinions. Whether we are "for" an issue, "against" it, or
stubbornly agnostic, we all have prefabricated defense positions to which we retreat
whenever the words are spoken. This is unavoidable for now. As we proceed into the
practical application of Covenantal Ethics in the field of bioethics, let us be honest about
any preconceived notions. Since we do not all agree about our basic starting points, we
will likely arrive at different conclusions and ending points. This is healthy and helpful
for the dialogue of bioethics. Keep in mind that no matter where we stand, each of us
can still look at this new system of covenantal ethics and critique its applications in this
area. Whether or not we agree on starting or ending points, if we can agree to a common
thought-process then we will, at the very least, be able to understand how we all can
communicate more effectively in the dialogue of bioethics.
Covenantal Ethics suggests that we have a respect for life. It also suggests that
we have a responsibility to life, a concept we will explore more fully in this section. We
then will look at the basic questions that Covenantal Ethics challenges us to answer,
including ideas of personhood, imago del, motive, method and ethical dilution. Then,
finally, I can suggest a covenantal response to this issue.
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b. Covenantal Ethics Suggests Both A Respect For Life And A Responsibility To Life

One thing that is clearly seen in a covenantal theory of ethics is a certain respect
for other human beings. If someone were to claim that a covenant exists between this
individual and another, then it is apparent that the first individual holds some respect for
the second. Those individuals from a Judeo-Christian heritage explain this respect by a
belief that all humans are created "in the image of God33." Of those outside this heritage,
many spiritually-minded people acknowledge a respect for other people as spiritual
beings. Respect need not be directed only toward someone who can reciprocate that
respect (in other words, we are not limited to a deontological respect for persons). From
the environmentalist movement and from Native American thought, it is obvious that
people can develop respect for life itself not limited to human life. These groups claim
that we have moral (covenantal?) obligations toward nonhuman life as well as human
life. Many people for whom spirituality is not an important factor still share a respect for
other people even if it is no more than respect for other members of the same species.
No matter what the reason, respect is necessary for the formation of a covenant.
This respect entails a sense of responsibility to uphold the covenant. Because we
respect an individual we respect the covenant which we have formed with them. As
mentioned earlier, May pointed out that these covenants enjoy a "comprehensive fidelity
(May 1983, 120)." The word, "responsibility" has many different historical meanings. It
will be worthwhile to examine what "responsibility" means in current, common usage as
well as what it originally meant, what it means in current philosophy and how a
covenantal meaning can include all of these meanings and more. If we are to honor our
covenants, we must first be certain we understand what responsibilities we have because

331 find this idea often misunderstood, yet full of potential contributions to the dialogue of bioethics.
Consequently, this issue will be addressed in depth later in this chapter.
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of them. In order to understand these specific, covenantal responsibilities, we need to
know what responsibility is, in general.

1) Common meaning of "responsibility"
When looking for a definition, the best place to start the search is usually a
current dictionary. The dictionary nearest to my desk defines responsibility as, "moral,
legal or mental accountability (Webster 1989, 848)." Without wanting to get caught in
an infinite ring of definitions, it is important to note the connection between
responsibility and accountability. "Accountability" is defined as, "the state of being
answerable34." We use the word, "responsible," in contexts where somebody is
answerable to somebody else. If we have a responsibility to someone, we acknowledge
that person has the right to ask us why we did something we were not expected to do or
why we failed to do something we were supposed to do. We further understand that we
better either do what is expected or have a reason for our action that shows respect for
the other person and the covenantal responsibility we have to him.
It is also important to note that Webster puts no prerequisites on responsibility.
We often err and assume that we can have responsibility only if we agree to have it. This
is not the case. A developing child is given increasing responsibility whether or not he
agrees. It is first his job to put away his toys. Then he is responsible to clean his room.
Then perhaps he is also responsible to help take out the garbage or other household
chores. Likewise, adults have responsibilities that we did not necessarily agree to. For
those who are United States citizens by birth, there are responsibilities to pay taxes,
register for the draft and participate in the electoral process. Surely we can try to "get
out" of these responsibilities by dodging the draft, by refusing to pay taxes, or by refusing

34Webster says that "accountability" is "the state of being accountable." The first definition for
"accountable" is "answerable."
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to vote. It is noteworthy that, when we try to get out of a responsibility, we admit that
there is a responsibility to "get out" of, even if we did not agree to have it. Perhaps most
of our responsibilities are voluntary, but "voluntariness" is not a prerequisite for
responsibility as we commonly use the word.

2) Original meaning of "responsibility"
A knowledge of the original meaning of a word is also important to properly
understand why the word is used the way it is. Probably the best early definition of
responsibility was given by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle claims that an
agent is responsible for all and only those acts that are not involuntary. Involuntary acts
are those performed under compulsion or out of ignorance. Two qualifications are made.
First, the ignorance itself must be involuntary. This is opposed to an ignorance of our
actions that we perform while drunk. Second, the ignorance must be of one or more
particulars of the circumstance and not ignorance of universal principles. For example, if
we did not know it was offensive in some parts of the world to use our left hand and we
did so, we could claim ignorance of that particular circumstance; if we killed somebody
in a foreign country we could not claim ignorance of the moral prohibition against killing
(Mellema January 30, 1996).

3) Current philosophical meaning of "responsibility35"
Aristotle's definition of responsibility is still being used today, even if it now has
different names or different twists. In 1977 J. L. Mackie presented what he termed the
"'straight rule of responsibility," "An agent is responsible for all and only his intentional
actions (Mackie 1991, 123-128)." Our word, "intentional" conveys the same meaning as

35The reader is encouraged to read H. R. Neighbor's Responsible Self for a better look at current ethics of
responsibility, I would like to someday and other strong works on the subject.
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Aristotle's "voluntary." Even more recent was the 1982 article by J. M. Fischer in which
he related responsibility and control. He claimed that if moral responsibility is present
then some type of control is also present (Fischer 1991, 170-188)36. One other example
from the field of specifically bioethics is Kass's discussion of the legal case of
Chalcraboty. Kass feels that responsibility entails a sense that we are answerable for our
actions37. All of these concepts are in line with Aristotle's idea of voluntary actions and
our current use of the word.

4) Covenantal meaning of "responsibility"
Covenantal Ethics thinks that all of these meanings of responsibility are good, but
asserts something beyond them. Bouma et al undeniably draw heavily upon their JudeoChristian heritage. Their religious tradition has much to add to the notion of covenantal
responsibility. The idea of "covenant," however, is not necessarily exclusive to this one
specific religious heritage (as was demonstrated by May's analysis of Faulkner). Since
Campbell correctly points out, "[The] translation from a religious context to a
philosophical one is not free from difficulties (Campbell 1990, 90)," we should not be
surprised if the interpretation of "responsibility" that is used by Bouma et al is not
entirely satisfactory to everyone outside of their tradition. Their theology uses concepts
of stewardship and dominion as part of responsibility. Nevertheless, the twist the authors
give "responsibility" helps capture something about a covenantal system of ethical theory.
Bouma et al never provide a formal definition of "responsibility." But, from the
way they use the word, their definition is probably something like "those actions,
36That control could be either "actual causal control" over all events and circumstances leading up to and
including a certain state of affairs, or it could be simply "regulative control" whereby an individual had the
capacity to ensure (and the capacity to prevent) a given state of affairs from occurring.
37This case involves the patent of a bacteria species. Kass sees this case as evidence that our society might
not always remember what "responsibility" entails. Kass claims that human responsibility to nature mandates
respect, not ownership. If we can own one species, then why not another? Who "owns" Homo sapiens
sapien (i.e. human life) (Kass 1985, 155)?
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attitudes and intended states of affairs that are entailed by faithfulness to God (Bouma
1989, 2)." It also seems apparent that, in the field of medicine, a commitment to caring
is not only a necessary attitude, but also a necessary action and the desired state of affairs
for anyone who is covenanted with God. The authors present the principle of informed
consent as a necessary sequelae to this commitment to caring. They become almost
deontological in their commitment to this principle. I would agree with them, but not
because "informed consent" is a universal principle or on any other deontological
grounds, but because of this. The phrase "informed consent" was originally intended not
as a legal principle but as a descriptive phrase for the process of communication that
takes place in an on-going physician-patient relationship. Any physician who truly has a
commitment to care for a patient (i.e. has covenanted with them), wants the patient to
understand as much as the patient wishes to understand, and to give the patient ample
opportunity for getting questions answered.
The commitments held by Bouma et al are shared by others who are not
necessarily from the same religious heritage. Donna Dickenson argues that the concept
of informed consent is useful, but only because it prevents blame being placed on
physicians for bad outcomes associated with moral luck (Dickenson 1991, 97-116).
Nevertheless, she believes that informed consent is necessary. Leon Kass, in his
discussions on the Hippocratic Oath, focuses on the vertical component of responsibility.
Physicians have a responsibility toward their profession that is best thought of as
something transcendent, above that which is spelled out in any particular oath or contract
(Kass 1985, 224-248). Even Dr. Kervorkian, a Michigan physician tried several times in
courts of law and finally convicted to prison for "mercy killing," emphasizes his
commitment to caring for his patients. He always went through a process he called
"informed consent."
From all of this, it may be possible to restate the definition of "responsibility" in
this way, "those actions, attitudes and desired states of affairs that are entailed by the
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covenants into which an individual has entered." All ethicists can see themselves as
responsible to the covenants they have made with others and the actions, attitudes and
states of affairs that are necessary to maintain these covenants, but Christians also
recognize the implications of a covenant made with their God.

2. How May Covenantal Ethics Impact Our Views on Abortion?

a. Covenantal Ethics Forces Us to Answer A Basic Question

Now let us proceed more specifically into the current ethical hot seat surrounding
the abortion controversy. Covenantal Ethics shapes our views on a variety of subjects
touching on all phases of life. Since this thesis only begins the discussion of Covenantal
Ethics, it is fitting to start at the beginning of a human life: conception. I would hope that
someday papers could be written examining how Covenantal Ethics impacts our views on
many other matters (e.g. assisted suicide, genetic research, reproductive technology,
allocation of resources). For now, we will have to content ourselves with only one topic,
that of abortion. For the purposes of this discussion, "abortion" refers to the artificially
induced termination of pregnancy. To be sure, spontaneous abortions do occur at
surprising rates38 but these do not constitute moral actions or the results thereof.
There are many questions elucidated by considering how our covenants with
others impact our views on abortion. There is one question that is logically prior to all
others, however. By "logically prior" I do not mean that this is always the first question

38According to a lecture given by Bouma to the Biology 396 class at Calvin College on February 27, 1996,
only 1/2 of all fertilized human eggs implant and only 1/4 of all fertilized human eggs survive the natural
hazards of gestation
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we must ask or that other questions should not be answered first in some situations. I
simply mean that, without an answer to this question, no other questions or answers will
make sense. This question can be stated, somewhat technically, "When does our
covenant with new human life begin?" In more common language, we could ask, "When
does a person become a person?" Other related questions include, "When does a human
life enter into the community of citizens?" or, "When is one part of the community?39"
Christians can modify the same question somewhat, "How fancy does a glob of human
DNA have to get (single sperm - implantation - embryo - birth - adulthood) before it can
be considered to be 'in the image of God?' Another closely related question follows,
"When does our covenant with new human life have enough weight that it would
preclude an abortion?"
Bouma et al help sort through several main themes in the current ethical dialogue
concerning abortion. There are two extreme positions, called "conceptionalism" and
"actualism" by the authors; there are at least three distinct positions that attempt to
compromise somewhere in between these two extreme views. The conceptionalist view
is that our covenant with new human life as soon as a human egg is fertilized by a human
sperm (i.e. a human life is just as valuable at conception as it is after birth and into
adulthood). The other extreme position is the actualist position. This position holds that
until birth, the human fetus deserves no more respect or responsibility than a fetus of any
other mammal.
The stage view, one of the middle positions, would assert that at some point
during gestation (no consensus has been reached as to precisely which point) personhood
begins in full and that no responsibility is felt toward the fetus/embryo/zygote before that
point. The gradualist position, a second middle position, answers the question by setting

39Gerald Winslow helped elucidate this question more completely through his personal correspondence.
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up several (still disputed) key points during gestation and demands increasing
responsibility toward the fetus/embryo/zygote as it develops past each point. The stage
view can be thought of as a stairway with the developing organism attaining more moral
worth as each step is reached. The gradualist view is the corresponding handicap access
ramp where there are no clear, definable boundaries (steps) that mark the attainment of
more moral worth; rather, moral worth is something that is accrued over time in a
gradual way. The potentialist view, a third middle view, does not attempt to specify at
which point more responsibility is needed when dealing with the developing organism.
Rather, it realizes that as development progresses, the potential this organism has for
imaging God (or developing into a person or becoming a being with moral value)
increases. Consequently, the responsibility we have in our covenants with the developing
organism increases proportionally to development. Our legal system has spelled out a
compromise approach toward responsibility to the human fetus in the Roe Vs. Wade
decision. From this decision, however, it is difficult to know whether the spirit behind
the law recognizes only two points of development whereby more respect is incurred
(stage view) or if the law recognizes that the fetus comes closer and closer to personhood
as development continues (gradualist view).
Bouma et al advocate the potentialist viewpoint and suggest that it comes closer
than the other views to the responsibilities entailed by our covenants. Even in adult life,
as people mature it is common that they deserve more respect and more responsibility.
Granted there is a basal level of responsibility toward all people, but our covenants with
people develop as the people themselves develop. To illustrate: when I was in highschool I helped lead a junior-high boys' cadre. In the course of those four years I saw the
eight boys in my cadre come closer and closer to becoming adult persons with whom I
would eventually make mature covenants. At the end of four years their potential for
personhood increased (and they began to image God more clearly). That was
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unmistakable for all of us leaders (as well as the boys). The potentialist view captures
the spirit of covenantal relationships.
If the potentialist view captures the essence of respect and responsibility that our
covenants have with developing human life this would lead us to be able to make some
statements on policy and action. For Bouma et al, the potentialist model is satisfactory.
Therefore, they are able to make an argument that we have covenantal responsibilities to
the mother considering abortion and to the developing life that will be ended by this
decision. All other things being equal, we would have to argue much more vehemently
against abortion the farther into pregnancy it is contemplated.
The potentialist model is useful, but it may not truly encapsulate the essence of
covenantal ethics. One difficulty is the ambiguity of some words like "personhood,"
"moral value," "image of God," and, "imaging God." All of these phrases seem to be
used interchangeably at some points and distinctly in other points. I have found it quite
helpful to be clear on the relationships these terms have to each other and their important
differences. "Moral value" is the generic term used to describe using ethical arguments,
why we should place value on a life or action. "Personhood" is a favorite term among
secular (and many Christian) ethicists that describes why we should assign moral value -because a being is not just a being, it is a person like you and I. "Image of God" is an old
phrase that we will look at in a moment that describes one interpretation of the biblical
account of human value. "Imaging God" is a human spin-off of "image of God." This
phrase assumes that we can see certain traits in humans that allow them to function as,
"imagers of God (Bouma 1989, 27)." It goes beyond saying that we share a common
characteristic to say that without the ability to do certain things, we cannot image God.
The following section may be especially useful for Christian readers curious about what
gives human life its value, but it is written using language of personhood so even
nonChristians may benefit from it.
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b. Personhood and "Imago Dei" (Latin -- image of God)

"When does personhood begin?" is an important question because, no matter how
the term is defined, we persons treat other persons differently than we treat living things
that are not persons. Naturally, one's definition of "person" will impact the answer one
gives to the question. I suggest, however, that before we spend too much more time
arguing about the correctness of particular answers we should examine both (1) what
type of answers we can generate and (2) why it is that we ask, "When does personhood
begin?" in the first place.
First, let us examine what type of answers we can give to the question, "When
does personhood begin?" From a strictly logical perspective, answers necessarily fall into
one of three categories. First, personhood may never begin. We do not need to spend
time on this option since most of us acknowledge that individual persons do exist, but
have not always existed and therefore personhood seems to have a beginning. Second,
personhood may begin at a specific time. Third, personhood may be acquired over time.
Among those who say that personhood begins at a specific time there is much
disagreement as to when that time actually is. Some common suggestions include
conception, "viability," birth, or attainment of significant cerebral capacity. Personhood
may begin at a certain time, but there is another possibility.
Maybe personhood does not begin at a specific time, but is acquired over time. A
common way of expressing this idea is to speak of the "potential person40." Another
author argues that potentiality is not the key idea, but rather "approximation," and,
"proximate personhood (Walters 1997)." In other words, how closely does this life
approximate a true person? We find disagreement both among those who argue that

40This comes close to the position held by Bouma et al.
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personhood is acquired over time and among those who suggested that personhood
begins at a specific time.
We have discussed the possible answers we can generate to the question, "When
does personhood begin?" and, unfortunately, found no answer that seems widely
accepted outside of particular schools of thought. Let us proceed and examine why we
ask, "When does personhood begin?" What are we saying when we answer this question?
Many different answers have been generated, but they all seem to be attempts to define
which entities have the same value as normal adult humans like you and me. These
different answers all seem to share one common assumption -- being a "person" is
prerequisite for an entity to have equal value to a normal adult human. While we cannot
agree on what exactly personhood is, or when it begins, we have apparently accepted the
fact that being a person is necessary for a living entity to have the same value that you
and I share as adult humans. In other words, "personhood" is the answer to another
question. That question can be phrased, "What makes human life valuable?"
Both this question, "What makes human life valuable?" and the question, "When
does personhood begin?" are important questions to ask and to answer. But they are truly
distinct questions. The question, "What makes human life valuable?" is logically prior to
the question, "When does personhood begin?" Those of us who wish to participate in this
discussion begin our reflection by considering what makes human life valuable. In
particular, we want to know why we, ourselves, are valuable. We decide that our value
comes from the fact that we have what we call, "personhood." We then move on to ask
when this "personhood" begins.
Let us take a moment to stop and consider the first question. Historically there
have been at least two answers given to the question, "What makes human life valuable?"
One answer was that the human body gave human life its value. The human body has
been highly esteemed throughout time. Recently, though, science has shown that the
human body is not so different from other bodies. All living bodies are composed of
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nearly the same proteins, fats, sugars and nucleic acids. The DNA that dictates how the
body appears is nearly identical in every living organism. It differs only in the various
ways it is arranged. A second answer became historically necessary. The second answer
was that the human mind seems to make human life more valuable and distinct41. No
other known species has mental capacities equal to that possessed by even a three-yearold human42, much less a full-grown adult. The question, "What makes human life
valuable?" is given the answer, "Personhood is what makes human life valuable."
Now, if "personhood" is the best possible answer to the question, "What makes
human life valuable?" then it is crucial that we continue to explore exactly when
personhood begins. If, however, there is another possible answer, then the exploration
into the details of personhood remains useful, but loses its some of its importance.
There was a major conceptual change in history when the value of human life
shifted from valuing the body to valuing the mind. It is doubtful that such a big change
will ever happen again. It would take something as improbable as being visited by a race
from another planet with minds far superior to our own and having these creatures force
us into servitude while laughing at our puny mental capacities to force us to look
elsewhere. But I rather suspect that look elsewhere we would. It seems unlikely that we,
as human persons, would sit idly by and say that since our mental capacities were
inferior, it was right and good that we served those who were greater because they had

41One could argue that in between these two answers and concurrent with them was the idea that the human
soul is what made human life valuable. I do not here have time to critique soul-body dualism, but I will give
away my bias. I find the writings of contemporary Jewish and feminist scholars who speak of humans as
"embodied spiritual beings" to be appealing. I am a single entity, a unity, not a composition of a soul-body,
not a duality. I argue that it is not body, soul, nor mind that makes human life valuable.
42Koko, the famous talking gorilla of the last decade, was judged to have a mental capacity equal to that of
a 2 1/2 year-old normal human child. Koko was the closest approximation to personhood science has
discovered outside the human species. Yet, even she could not compete with a three year-old child (Walters
1997, 2, 102).
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more value than we did. It is likely that we will not be forced to come up with a better
answer, but it seems possible that a better answer might exist43.
Answering the question, "What makes human life valuable?" in terms of
"personhood" appeals to one particular facet of our existence -- our empirical (derived
from our five senses) reason. However, as Immanuel Kant demonstrates, reason, in its
pure employment operates on levels beyond that of the empirical. If we could identify
some of these areas, they might provide insights into answers that would appeal to facets
of pure reason other than the empirical. Kant also demonstrated that some religious
beliefs reach beyond the empirical employment of pure reason (Kant 1929, 646). By
moving from the empirical employment of pure reason to its transcendental (i.e. dealing
with things not derived from our senses), practical employment, Kant hoped to get
beyond the realm of empiricism. In this section I, too, would like to attempt to get
beyond scientific laws and explanations and to reach out to transcendent moral truths.
The question, "What makes human life valuable?" is not an empirical question,
but a transcendental one. That is, we cannot give scientific proof of this value claim.
We must, therefore, offer a transcendental answer. In its transcendental employment,
pure reason reaches toward religious ideas. While different religious traditions may have
43The following quote clearly captures the idea I was trying to convey, that human life is valuable because
of something external to the human condition. I include my own clarifications in brackets:
"What if we encountered a 'superior' species' that has the capacities for mentation that we
don't even begin to comprehend? And suppose, further, that the other species could not
even communicate directly with us because of our failure to use a [superior] mode of
communication that is common to [all superior] species, but totally unavailable to us
[since we are so inferior]. Would we, then, be likely to agree with their assessment that
their lives are protectable [and ours are not] because of their superiority [and our
inferiority]? I doubt this; we wouldn't even know [be able to comprehend] their grounds
for distinction [discrimination]. For believers in an all-knowing God, this line of reasoning
is not [entirely] hypothetical. We believe that God is just such a 'species' (cf. Isaiah 55:89). But we are also pleased to think that we matter not only to ourselves, but to God.
One of the troubles with the personhood approach [or any other approach based on
human abilities or appearances] is that it represents a most elegant bigotry: value depends
on being just like us! If God takes this approach we are all in deep trouble [and we must
therefore avoid any approach like this] (personal communication from Gerald Winslow)."
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different contributions to make to the discussion at hand, the Judeo-Christian tradition
has one particular teaching that is well worth considering. This tradition has long taught
that humanity was created in the image of God. Exploring this teaching will help us
reach beyond the empirical to arrive at a more transcendental answer to the question,
"What makes human life valuable?"
In a certain sense we have already been exploring this teaching in the practical
employment of pure reason. We have be trying to fmd our value and distinctiveness by
looking for divine qualities in humanity. Some have seen a god-like quality in the human
body. More recently, some have seen a god-like quality in the human mind. Perhaps,
however, we are god-like not in our bodies, nor in our minds, but in the fact that, what
exists between God and us is similar to what exists between God Himself44.
It is impossible to put into words the entirety that exists between God Himself.
The writers of the New Testament used a word ayanc (agape) as in the phrase, "God is
agape." The English rendition of agape is love. Perhaps more helpful is the word c.tyri
(zoe) as in, "In him was zoe and that zoe was the light of men." The English rendition of
zoe is life -- life as God has life. It is quite possible that what makes us most like God is
that there exists some of this love and life between God and humans that is like the love
and life that exist within God Himself.
Permit me to use an analogy. I have spent several summers working out in the
woods as a counselor at a summer youth camp in Michigan. The nearby lakes were
favorite breeding grounds for millions of mosquitoes. Now, I know of no good thing that
any mosquito has ever done for anything, except maybe to provide food; but even
creatures that dine on the mosquitoes would be perfectly capable of finding other food
were not mosquitoes so readily available. Anyway, I took great pride in each and every

441 am, of course, presuming that God is Trinity and there is something for an in between to be between.
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one of the hundreds of mosquitoes I killed in a given week. It mattered not to me what
the mosquito looked like or how developed it was. I did not care if it was intending to
bite me or even capable of biting me. I would kill it. I would even have smashed
mosquito eggs if I could have found them, just to prevent any more mosquitoes from
having a life. I was hatred and death to any and all mosquitoes and even to some poor
creatures who looked enough like mosquitoes that I killed them. I only wanted them to
get close to me so I could smash them with the palm of my hand.
That which exists between us and God may be almost exactly opposite to that
which exists between mosquitoes and me. Even if it were true that we served no purpose
from His perspective, He takes great pride in each and every individual to whom He can
bestow life -- life as He has life. It does not matter what we look like, what our
intentions are or what developmental stage we are in. He is love and life to any and all of
us. He would make us live. He would go to any length just to ensure that each of us
attains the life that He has to offer. He only wants us to come close to Him so he can
hold us in the palm of His hand.
That which gives value to human life is nothing that is inherent in any human. It
is not the human body nor the human mind. It is not even the attainment of "personhood"
(and, consequently, neither is it the potential for personhood nor an entity's proximity to
personhood). It is simply the fact that God extends to us that which is within God
Himself. Our covenant with God shares its essence with the covenant that exists between
God Himself With this covenant impacting our lives we cannot avoid its necessary
impact on all our other covenants as well. Because God is love and life, He extends that
love and life to us. Since God values us and loves us, we also ought to value and love
each other.
God has created the whole of this world. His covenant with me gives me
responsibilities toward Creation and mandates that I respect it. I broke faith with this
covenant each summer as a camp counselor by blatantly destroying hundreds of mosquito
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lives. The Bible says that not a sparrow can fall from the sky without God knowing and
caring about it. How much more important are hundreds of mosquitoes? How much
more important are human embryos and fetuses? Does God care any less for them than
for me or for their mother? Does he not covenant with them, giving them the same
arms (love) and

006

(life) that he gives us?

Imago Dei -- we are created in the image of God. All of us, regardless of our
potential for personhood or our approximation of the same, are created and sustained by
his life and his love.

c. Questions of Motive and Method

A second important question in decisions about the legitimacy of abortion is the
question of motive. Without the need to be completely deontological, Covenantal Ethics
allows, perhaps even demands, that we ask why we are doing what we are doing. This is
not to say that motive or intent is the only thing we need to look at, but we must not
ignore it either. We, health practitioners and community members alike, may be in
covenants with a woman seeking an abortion; covenantal ethics demands we respect this
relationship between us, seek to fully understand her motives and thereby strengthen the
covenant between us. Is this woman seeking the abortion for reasons that are socioeconomic, genetic, therapeutic, and/or traumatic? Do all these situations reflect the same
motivation for the act? Have we tried to understand what has happened to this woman,
what is happening to her and what she feels may happen to her? We cannot respond
meaningfully unless we do. We need to know the first part of a story before we can help
make sense of the next chapter. Covenantal ethics demands we answer the question of
motive.
The third question that covenantal ethics forces us to raise when considering
cases of abortion is the method that is used. Here in the United States we have
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established clinics with the sole purpose of surgical abortion. Unfortunately, a large
number of these remain under no governmental regulation. Abortions are also performed
in more closely supervised hospital settings. "Emergency contraception," oral
medications taken the morning after unprotected intercourse, allows the abortion of a
fetus by making implantation impossible. In Europe and now the United States as well,
physicians are able to prescribe RU486 making emergency contraception more effective
and reducing the need for surgical abortions. Covenantal ethics shows that the method
chosen does have ethical implications. Our covenant with the woman is affected by her
understanding of the significance of implantation in the development of her pregnancy
and its impact on he human life depending on her. It makes a difference for our
covenants with each other as members of society whether oral abortifactants are readily
available and effective. Our conception of conception changes if conception is less likely
either to lead to inevitable delivery or to sub-optimal surgical abortion.

d. Questions of Ethical Dilution

There is a current trend in moral philosophy as well as the popular understanding
that I may be less responsible for my actions if "Somebody else is doing it" as well. This
is not a new phenomenon. It is called ethical dilution. Since the notion is so prevalent, it
is worthwhile to examine it briefly here. The approach to evaluating the ethical nature of
abortion that was suggested by Bouma (Bouma March 5, 1996) calls for some dilution of
responsibility as more people are involved in an act of abortion. For this reason, he
argued that a pharmaceutical agent prescribed by a physician for the purpose of abortion
is preferable to a surgical abortion. In the surgical method, not only are the fetus, mother
and physician involved, but so are the attendants, nurses and assistants. In the case of a
pharmaceutical abortion, the attendants, nurses, and assistants have no responsibility for
the abortion. Bouma further argued that the physicians responsibility was also lessened
68

since the physician did not ultimately make the choice of whether or not to ingest the
drugs; that was the patient's decision and involved, apparently, only her and the life
inside of her.
Is it possible that there is a larger absolute value of responsibility when a surgical
abortion is performed? Is the proverbial "pie" any larger? If not, then each individual has
a smaller absolute level of responsibility since there are more pieces of the same pie.
The opposite must then also be true. By extrapolation, it seems that Bouma believes that
the mother has more responsibility in the case of a pharmaceutical abortion than in a
surgical method simply because she recruits others to help dilute her responsibility; her
piece of the pie is much larger with the pill because there are fewer pieces (perhaps she
may even be responsible for the whole pie, if Bouma is right). lithe pie is larger, I must
ask, "Why?" since the same goal is achieved by either method. Something does not seem
right to me about this way of thinking.
Please recall that in the section on the method of application of covenantal ethics
it became clear that each of us bears the same responsibility for the on-going dialogue of
medical ethics. Zimmerman effectively argued that ethical dilutionism is non-existent.
Mellema argues the same conclusion from a position he calls ethical anti-dilutionism,
"The degree of an agent's retrospective responsibility for a state of affairs is unaffected
by the fact that other agents are likewise responsible for the same state of affairs
(Mellema March 5, 1996)." According to this position there would be no difference in
the responsibility of the mother between the pharmaceutical method and the surgical one.
It is not apparent that a covenantal view of ethics dictates a stance on ethical dilutionism.
This area calls for flexibility and honesty in the on-going dialogue.
For the sake of discussion, and in an effort to transition into the last section of this
thesis, I will suggest that covenantal ethics can inform our view of ethical dilutionism,
even if it does not mandate a specific response. I suggest that covenantal ethics lends
itself more closely to the anti-dilutionist standpoint of Mellema. It seems that our
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responsibility to bring about a given state affairs for a given unborn fetus, or for a
pregnant mother, is no more or less when others are involved in bringing about the same
state of affairs. If it turns out that we have a covenant responsibility to both the mother
and the human life inside of her then our failure to uphold either covenant is not lessened
by the fact that others help us fail. As a child, the fact that "everybody else" was teasing
a classmate, never seemed to make my parents or teachers think that it was right for me
to do so. If it turns out that we have a responsibility to prevent a birth or a death, then we
incur no more or less praise or blame when we do it alone than when we have assistance.
Even though our covenant with one life may indeed be impacted by our covenant with
another, our covenant with the life in question remains.

3. What Sort of Response to Abortion Is Mandated by Covenantal Ethics?

We have considered our responsibility toward the covenants involved in cases of
abortion. We have considered the impact of motivation and method in considering
abortion. The only question that now remains is the most important one, "What sort of
response to abortion is mandated by a covenantal system of ethics?" Permit me to
examine this question as if I were an actual physician in the exam room with a patient
requesting abortion at an initial consultation. I choose an initial consultation because at
this point, it will only be my responsibility to offer counsel, rather than at a later visit
where I may have the additional responsibility to perform an abortion or to prescribe
medications to induce an abortion.
The answer that follows may, at first glance, look like relativism. But the careful
reader has understood the differences between covenantal ethics and relativism. To
review -- relativism implies that individuals bear the responsibility of determining right
action and that right action differs from person to person, community to community, or
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culture to culture. The covenantal answer does not depend on persons determining right
actions that differ from person to person, but it depends on the actions, attitudes, and
intended states of affairs that are entailed by the covenants into which a person or
community has entered. Consequently, faithfulness to our covenants may require
different actions in different circumstances. So, in the instance of abortion we cannot
generate a general moral principle whereby all abortion is, by definition, good or evi145.
Nor may we leave it up to each individual to determine a person-relative view of right
and wrong. Instead we must look at the covenants we have with the developing human
life, with the mother, and with society in order to make a decision concerning abortion.
Christians would have the added responsibility of looking first to covenants that they
have with God.
Bouma et al list three possible responses to abortions and hint at a fourth (Bouma
1989, 95). First, they suggest that we can choose to cooperate with a decision to abort.
Second, we could choose to tolerate a decision to abort without cooperating with it.
Third, we could respect the reasoning behind the decision to abort without tolerating the
abortion. The implied fourth response is refusal to respect the reasoning behind the
decision, and refusing to either tolerate or cooperate with the decision to abort. In all
these responses, our covenant with the person choosing abortion entails responsibility
and respect for the person giving the reason even if we do not respect the reasoning or
agree with the decision.
One final tidbit may be useful for our discussion. The tidbit I have in mind deals
with moral taxonomy (i.e. how we can classify moral actions). The book entitled Beyond
the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation and Offense sets forth a seven-fold system

45it
It s not uncommon among conservative Christians to state simply, that God prohibits all killing and,
therefore, abortion is always prohibited. People who make this claim forget that biblical literature is fill of
references to God commanding his chosen people to kill people. From this we must deduce that not all
killing is wrong and, therefore, that not all abortion is wrong.
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of moral actions: obligatory, supererogatory, quasi-supererogatory, neutral, quasi-offense,
offense and forbidden (Mellema 1991, 105)46. In discussing abortion, there are many
acts that could be classified in this moral taxonomy (e.g. the act of abortion, the omitting
of abortion, the assisting in an abortion, the process of deciding what to do), but let us
just consider one act as a test case. One act that should always be considered, whether or
not it is chosen, is the act of a mother deciding to bring a child to term, in spite of
considerations which might tend to tip the scales in favor of an abortion (e.g. traumatic
pregnancy, therapeutic disadvantages, genetic considerations and/or socio-economic
difficulties).
How should we classify the act of attempting to bring the child to term? If it is
classified as a forbidden act then we clearly have a covenantal obligation to cooperate
with an abortion, or else we participate in a morally forbidden act and thus violate our
covenants with others. If it is an obligatory act then we must not tolerate (may we even
respect?) any action to weaken her resolution; to do any less would violate our covenants
with others. If it is neutral then we have a covenantal obligation to tolerate her decision
no matter what it is, assuming we fulfill whatever obligations we have to help her make
the best decision possible. If this act is classified somewhere between these three
possibilities (i.e. as supererogation, quasi-supererogation, quasi-offense or offense) then
our covenantal responsibility lies somewhere in between as well.
Most of the time, it is likely that a woman's decision to try and bring a child to
term is not blameworthy. I can think of no time when it is; perhaps the reader can, so I
will avoid any absolute statements at this point. Also, most of the time, such a decision
is not morally neutral; there is fairly unified agreement between Pro-choice and Pro-life
460bligatory (Forbidden) acts are those that we are morally obligated to perform (omit) and for whose
omissions (commissions) we are blameworthy. Supererogatory (offensive) acts are those which are 1)
praiseworthy (blameworthy) to perform, 2) not obligatory (forbidden) and 3) not blameworthy
(praiseworthy) to perform (omit). Quasi-supererogatory acts are those which are praiseworthy to perform,
not obligatory and blameworthy to omit. Quasi-offensive acts are blameworthy to perform, not forbidden
and praiseworthy to omit.
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advocates that such decisions are, in fact, moral. It seems too much to say that such a
decision is always obligatory; it is rarely obligatory for someone to suffer voluntarily, as
would many women whose pregnancies had traumatic beginnings or whose lives were at
stake. If these musings are correct, then this decision -- to attempt to bring a pregnancy
to term in the face of adverse circumstances -- is most properly classified as
supererogatory. If it is supererogatory then our response to a woman contemplating
abortion in these specific cases should be to counsel her to do what is morally best
(perform a supererogatory act), but not to judge her harshly if she makes this omission,
since she is not morally blameworthy.
While some specific cases may be more clear-cut than others, it is not
clear that a covenantal ethical system dictates into which category the decision to
bring a pregnancy to term always falls. What is clear, though, is that our
responsibility to protect the developing human life increases as time goes by.
Abortion becomes less and less a viable option with time regardless of its
taxonomy in the earliest stages. An embryo that survives to implantation has just
doubled its statistical chances for becoming a person / imaging God; our ability
to recognize it as imago dei is also improving. Therefore, our responsibility to
protect it must also increase. Whether or not we decide to cooperate with an
abortion early in gestation, we still can respect the reason behind the abortion (or
the decision to refrain from aborting). And whether or not we agree with the
decision in no way lessens our responsibility to care for the mother after she has
acted upon it.
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CONCLUSION

Writing a conclusion for an unfinished project, like this one, is difficult. We have
covered a lot of ethical ground, but have only traversed the front yard and opened the
gate. There is a whole world out there waiting to be explored from a perspective of
Covenantal Ethics. Covenants impact our ethical decisions in many fields other than
medical ethics -- law, business, welfare, education, citizenship. But we have not yet
explored even a fraction of the impact covenantal ethics has in medical ethics. Just a few
of the myriad questions waiting for us involve issues of euthanasia, reproductive
technology, genetic manipulation, allocation of resources, and medical reimbursement.
Nevertheless, this is an appropriate place to conclude. We have covered a lot of ethical
ground, but have only traversed the front yard and opened the gate. But, we have crossed
the front yard. We have opened the gate. Before today, we had only been peeking out of
the windows at a world of Covenantal Ethics.
We have realized that there is a problem in bioethics because Christians
and nonChristians have been without a common dialect. We have seen how
covenantal language can bridge that communication gap. Covenantal Ethics has a
rich heritage in classical, biblical, popular and philosophical literature. It utilizes
the strengths of teleology and deontology, virtue ethics and casuistry, while
avoiding their pitfalls. It avoids relativism, especially for Christians, since it rests
on the inviolability of covenants and especially on our covenants with an
Absolute, God. It can be utilized in one or more practical ways. It gives insight
into discussions about abortion. Covenantal ethics will impact the way we talk
about any topic in bioethics from now on.
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